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 This thesis examines US protectionism in the 1980s from Canadian and American 
perspectives, and its role in Canada’s pursuit of the historic 1988 Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement. It analyzes the perceived “threat” of protectionism and evaluates the agreement’s 
provisions against Canada’s goal of securing access to the US market. It contends that US 
protectionism was crucial in the Mulroney government’s decision to negotiate a bilateral 
agreement and was a contentious issue for the agreement’s critics. US sources, unexamined in 
existing historiography, confirm the increased threat of American protectionism, but emphasize a 
distinction between the threat and implementation of protectionist trade law. Although the 
agreement did not shield Canada from US trade remedies, Canada gained important presence in 
the trade dispute process. These conclusions are drawn from Canadian and American media and 
government documents, 1980s academic and think-tank commentary, legal documents, the 
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Introduction 
 
 On the first day of formal Canada-United States trade negotiations, 21 May 1986, 
President Reagan imposed a 35 percent duty on Canadian cedar shakes and shingles exported to 
the US. Even though shakes and shingles accounted for a minute portion of Canada’s total 
exports to the US, Mulroney was infuriated. In a letter to Reagan, Mulroney expressed extreme 
disapproval of the tariff, calling it “pure protectionism,” and a betrayal of their previous pledges 
to reduce Canada-US trade barriers, promote liberalized trade, and reject the forces of 
protectionism.1 In his reply, Reagan emphasized the strong bi-partisan tide of protectionism that 
ran through Congress and expressed hope that the trade action would not damage their personal 
relationship. For Mulroney, however, more than a personal relationship was at stake – he 
believed the entire affair made it difficult for him to domestically promote a free trade agreement 
(FTA) and maintain a climate suitable for continued negotiations.2 Mulroney was not 
exaggerating.   
 Free trade with the United States and the pursuit of unimpeded access to the US market 
has been a defining and contentious issue in Canada’s economic and political history. Prior to 
Confederation, the question of freer trade with the United States dominated Canadian trade 
policy considerations. Britain’s discontinuance of mercantilism, repeal of the Corn Laws, and 
adoption of free trade from 1846-8 terminated Canada’s guaranteed access to the British market, 
forcing Canada to seek new markets for its exports. The geographically close, large and 
expanding US market was an obvious outlet, and the 1854 Elgin-Marcy Reciprocity Treaty 
secured both countries’ tariff-free trade on a range of products. The US decision to abrogate the 
treaty in 1865 amplified Canadian worries about export stability. From 1866 to 1874, Canada 
 
1 Brian Mulroney, Memoirs: 1939-1993 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007): 448.  
2 Mulroney, Memoirs, 448-449.    
attempted to negotiate a new FTA with the US on three separate occasions but was unsuccessful 
due to strong American protectionist sentiments. The rejection of a new trade pact was a 
fundamental catalyst of John A. Macdonald’s 1879 National Policy, but this high-tariff system 
was not particularly advantageous for Canadian exporters of natural resources and manufactured 
products. By 1911, a new free trade initiative, this time with US approval and with provisions 
favourable to Canada, almost became a reality. It was struck down by the Canadian public in the 
election of 1911, when Borden’s anti-free trade Conservatives defeated Laurier’s Liberals and 
their pro-free trade platform.  
 Efforts to liberalize trade re-emerged during the Great Depression with reasonable 
success. The US and Canada concluded reduced-tariff pacts in 1935 and 1938 as a result of 
Roosevelt’s “good neighbour” policy. This represented a shift from the highly protectionist US 
trade legislation manifested in the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930), and Buy America 
Act (1933). For six months between 1947-8, Canada secretly met with the US to negotiate a new 
FTA. At the last minute, Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King abolished the initiative 
in fear of political retaliation similar to that experienced by his mentor Laurier in 1911. Postwar 
trade policy centered upon the liberalizing efforts of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), but proved ineffective at insulating Canada from US protectionist flare-ups. However, 
the 1965 Auto Pact was a successful sectoral arrangement that strengthened the Canadian 
manufacturing industry.3 As the US faced increased competition from the Pacific Rim, questions 
of its global competitiveness and a more serious contemplation of the use of trade remedies 
characterized US trade policy into the 1980s. Any increase in US protectionism profoundly 
influenced Canadian trade policy, and the drama which surrounded the Canada-US negotiations 
                                                 
3 Bruce Muirhead, Dancing Around the Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American 
Dominance, 1957-1973 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007): 85-87.   
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in the 1980s culminated in the 1988 federal election. Canada took the “leap of faith” into a new, 
comprehensive and unparalleled trade agreement with the US, distancing itself from the 
economic nationalism of the 1970s.4 US Congressional protectionism was not strong enough to 
avert the signing and implementation of the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA).   
  Although Canada’s trade policy is only one key variable relevant to its economic 
performance, it has tremendous political significance. Existing historiography on the CUSFTA 
has centered on an array of trade-related issues, from its influence on Canadian foreign and 
domestic policy, to its sectoral-economic impacts, and to the drama of the trade negotiations. The 
historiography has also been highly polarized, much like the debate on free trade itself. 
Relatively little material has been written on the CUSFTA from a historical perspective.5 
Political scientists have tended to overlook the CUSFTA since the completion of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – an unfortunate omission, given that the CUSFTA 
was an important precursor to NAFTA. Although a specific history primarily focused on US 
protectionism and its relationship to the CUSFTA has yet to appear, US protectionism has been 
discussed in some of the major works.  
 G. Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin’s Faith and Fear (1991) was the first comprehensive 
study to discuss the role of US protectionism in the formation of Canadian trade policy. They 
contended that US protectionist sentiments became more vehement in the 1980s, exhibited by the 
increased use of US trade remedy laws against Canada. This resulted in preliminary rulings 
against Canada by the US International Trade Commission (ITC) about 75 percent of the time 
                                                 
4 Michael Hart, Bill Dymond and Colin Robertson, Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade 
Negotiations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994): 54-58. Other essential works on Canadian trade policy include: 
Michael Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy From Colonialism to Globalization (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2001); Randall White, Fur Trade to Free Trade: Putting the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement in Historical 
Perspective (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989).  
5 Much more material was written during formal and informal trade negotiations, 1985-1988.   
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from 1980 to 1986. They identified the rising tide of US protectionism brought on by the 1981-
1982 recession as a significant cause in the pragmatic Canadian pursuit of an FTA to secure 
access to the US market and shield against American protectionism (as the Macdonald 
Commission and Business Council on National Issues (BCNI) had also recommended).6 US 
protectionism was confirmed as a major threat to Canadian economic sustainability. In an 
evaluation of the agreement, Doern and Tomlin argued that the new dispute settlement system 
was beneficial to Canada as it gained procedural access to the decisions and application of US 
trade remedy law. They also regarded the agreement’s broad tariff reductions as an achievement 
that enhanced Canada’s access to the US market.7    
 Ardent free trade opponent Mel Hurtig also reinforced the dichotomous nature of the 
debate in The Betrayal of Canada (1991). Hurtig argued that the CUSFTA did not benefit 
Canada whatsoever. It failed to both reduce or exempt Canadian vulnerability to US trade laws, 
ultimately leaving Canada just as susceptible to US protectionist whims (and a US Congress that 
insisted on the annual scrutiny of Canadian trade practices before agreeing to implement the 
legislation that made the CUSFTA law).8 For Hurtig, this conclusion was confirmed by the US 
prosecution of trade actions against Canadian exporters after the agreement was enacted, which 
included anti-dumping charges, countervailing duties (CVDs), meat inspection barriers, and 
import quotas. Hurtig blatantly opposed the agreement for other reasons relating to its economic 
and social impacts, and concluded that Canada’s objective of enhancing its access to the US 
market was not achieved. Canada remained fully unguarded from US trade remedies because the 
                                                 
6 G. Bruce Doern and Brian Tomlin, Faith and Fear: The Free Trade Story (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1991): 
68, 275-285.  
7 Doern and Tomlin, Faith and Fear, 249-253.   
8 Mel Hurtig, The Betrayal of Canada (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1991): 187-188.  
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agreement did not define acceptable “subsidies.”9 Hurtig focused on the agreement’s short-term 
impacts, and did not evaluate the strength of US protectionism during the 1980s. 
 Michael Hart, Colin Robertson and Bill Dymond’s Decision At Midnight (1994) was a 
seminal work that focused primarily on the negotiations.10 The authors based their assessment of 
the CUSFTA on the contention that the US protectionist sentiments and trade actions of the 
1980s represented a strong outbreak of protectionism not experienced since the 1930s. 
Protectionism re-emerged in the US as a defensible and accepted view. This posed a significant 
threat to Canadian economic growth and overall export stability.11 The authors concluded that 
the agreement was a good one which mostly met Canadian policy objectives, especially the goal 
of gaining secured access to the US market. The authors positively appraised the dispute 
settlement provisions of the agreement which “constrained” the pursuit of US trade remedies.12 
However, Canada’s gains on reduced US trade remedy vulnerability were a “qualified” success, 
as both countries failed to create mutually agreeable rules on subsidies. Nonetheless, Canada 
gained a bilateral forum to challenge future applications of US trade laws. They also asserted that 
“real security…could only have been achieved if Canadians were to have become immune from 
the application of American trade law,”13 but that complete exemption of US trade laws was not 
an actual Canadian negotiating objective. Indeed, it was unrealistic because many of the US trade 
remedy laws were sanctioned by the GATT. The CUSFTA’s elimination of conventional tariffs 
also contributed to their positive assessment.  
                                                 
9 Hurtig, The Betrayal, 188.  
10 Hart, Dymond and Robertson were all members of the Canadian free trade team with the Department of External 
Affairs during negotiations. Hart also helped coordinate and write A Review of Canadian Trade Policy and Trade 
Policy for the 1980s, two essential policy documents discussed in Chapter 1. Similar points from those reports are 
made in Decision at Midnight. See Hart et al, Decision at Midnight, “About the Authors,” 455-456.    
11 Ibid, 36, 309, 376.  
12 Ibid, 376. 
13 Ibid, 379.  
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 J.L. Granatstein also briefly addressed the role of US protectionism in the Canadian 
pursuit of an FTA in Yankee Go Home? (1996). Though Granatstein’s main focus was on 
Canadian nationalism and anti-American sentiments, he maintained that the Canadian quest for 
improved trade relations came as a result of the 1981-1982 recession. He emphasized that 
increased protectionist sentiments in the US Congress resulted from foreign competition, trade 
deficits, and high unemployment in the “rust belt.”14 These developments caused the Liberals 
and their Conservative successors to reconsider trade policies and were a catalyst in Mulroney’s 
pursuit of a bilateral FTA. In his final analysis, the re-election of Mulroney in 1988 represented 
another strike against anti-Americanism in Canada and improved bilateral trade relations.15 
 In a paper presented at a Canada-US trade conference (2000), Paul Wonnacott argued 
that the issue of assured access to the US market shaped the Canadian negotiating strategy and 
was the “precipitating factor” in seeking an agreement and a dispute settlement mechanism.16 
Wonnacott, an American, explained that US trade remedy laws stemmed from what Americans 
called “fair trade” laws aimed at leveling the free trade field. Across the border, the term 
“contingency protection” was used more frequently in Canadian rhetoric when Canada was 
subjected to countervail and anti-dumping charges. The Canadian quest for a dispute settlement 
mechanism and reduced vulnerability to trade remedy laws were contentious issues for Congress. 
Also, negative Canadian perceptions of US protectionism were heightened by the softwood 
lumber issue which was fundamentally caused by conflicting definitions of acceptable and 
unacceptable subsidies.17      
                                                 
14 J.L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996): 248-250.  
15 Granatstein, Yankee Go Home? 281.  
16 Paul Wonnacott, “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: The Issue of Assured Access,” In Building a 
Partnership: The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Edited by Mordechai Kreinen (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2000): 70.  
17 Wonnacott, “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 75-76.  
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 Nelson Michaud and Kim Nossal’s edited collection on Mulroney’s Conservative foreign 
policy, Diplomatic Departures (2001), included articles on the free trade initiative. Brian Tomlin 
expanded on his earlier argument, contending that Canada’s decision to pursue an FTA with the 
US was pragmatic, not ideological.18 Tomlin pinpointed Washington’s chief foreign-trade policy 
concern as the perceived “unfair” trading practices of its partners which added to the 
protectionist thrust and a “greater willingness in the United States to move more aggressively to 
curb imports.”19 Mulroney faced an amplified barrage of US protectionism, manifested in more 
frequent investigations of Canadian export practices and increased Congressional legislation 
aimed at limiting Canadian exports.20 In Tomlin’s view, the road to free trade was paved 
primarily by these developments. This argument was corroborated by Gordon Mace, who 
observed that even though Canada was seldom the main target of increased American 
protectionism in the 1980s (Japan and Europe faced much more), Canadian exporters still faced 
an uneasy and anxious climate. Canada thus found itself in the “crossfire” of US trade measures, 
compounded by a continuously greater reliance on the US market. To resolve this serious 
economic dilemma, the Mulroney government sought an FTA.21 For Michaud and Nossal, its 
quest for an FTA represented a dramatic and pragmatic shift in Conservative foreign trade policy 
trends extending back to the 1911 election.22  
 The historiography has been relatively unified in its basic assessments of US 
protectionism and the CUSFTA (with the exception of nationalists such as Hurtig). Given the 
                                                 
18 Brian Tomlin, “Leaving the Past Behind: The Free Trade Initiative Assessed,” In Diplomatic Departures: The 
Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1993, Edited by Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001): 48-57.  
19 Tomlin, “Leaving the Past,” 49.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Gordon Mace, “Explaining Canada’s Decision to Join the OAS: An Interpretation,” In Diplomatic Departures: 
149-151.  
22 Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal, “Diplomatic Departures? Assessing the Conservative Era in Foreign 
Policy,” In Diplomatic Departures: 290-291.  
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established importance of US protectionism in Canada’s decision to pursue an FTA, it is striking 
that the authors have only superficially engaged the subject itself. The scholars who have 
objected to the CUSFTA have not done so on the basis of the agreement’s guards against US 
protectionism.23  
 More analysis is necessary of the fundamental premise that heightening US protectionism 
justified an agreement. The historiography has not examined how Canadian opponents to an FTA 
responded to the assertion that US protectionism represented a significant threat to Canadian 
economic sustainability. Critically examining this point is vital for understanding the free trade 
debate. Previous scholars have not had the privilege of studying the recently published memoirs 
of Brian Mulroney, Derek Burney, Pat Carney, and the diaries of Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, to 
assess Canadian thoughts on US protectionism. The analysis of US protectionism’s influence on 
Canadian government trade policy documents also remained general. Chapter 1 adds breadth to 
the debate and specifically analyzes the role of US protectionism in the free trade initiative, and 
how opponents responded to the question of US protectionism.  
 Claims about the strength of US protectionism in the 1980s have been based on Canadian 
perceptions and sources. A grounded assessment must critically engage US government and 
media sources to validate, adjust, or clarify these claims. Chapter 2 explores whether the 
perceived threat of US protectionism was as strong as some Canadians stressed and considers the 
overall nature of 1980s American trade policy.   
Lastly, the historiographical assessments of the CUSFTA do not directly reference or 
analyze the text of the agreement; particularly its guards against US protectionism. A precise 
understanding of the agreement and its provisional shields against trade remedies must place 
                                                 
23 See Maude Barlow, Parcel of Rogues: How Free Trade is Failing Canada (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1990); 
Lawrence Martin, Pledge of Allegiance: The Americanization of Canada in the Mulroney Years (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1993).   
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primary importance on its legal provisions. Chapter 3 evaluates to what extent the actual 
agreement guarded against US protectionism, with specific references to various articles and the 
underlying assumptions of the CUSFTA itself. In these capacities, this thesis contributes to the 








                                                
Chapter 1: Canada and US Protectionism 
 
 Canada is often described as a “trading nation” given its dependence on exports to create 
wealth, its small domestic market, and its abundance of natural resources. Canadian exporters 
and corporations have always perceived the American market (about ten times the size of 
Canada’s) as a great economic engine. In the interwar years, the US overcame Britain as 
Canada’s largest and most important export market and trading partner.1  By 1984, three quarters 
of all Canadian trade was with the US, totaling nearly $156 billion in exports and imports.2  That 
year, exports to the United States accounted for more than fourteen times the amount to Japan, 
Canada’s next largest trading partner. The growth in exports to the United States in 1984 alone 
was more than the combined total of all Canadian exports to Europe and Japan.3    
 The clichés about the nature of the Canadian export economy became increasingly 
relevant in the 1970s and 1980s. The United States began losing some of its comparative 
economic advantage to other newly industrialized nations, especially in its labour-intensive 
sectors which suffered from the lower production costs and government subsidy programs of its 
competitors. As the United States entered an increasingly globalized trading environment (which 
contrasted with its post-war domestic-oriented economy), it faced mounting international 
competition. Other economic problems contributed to a weak American economy: a high US 
dollar, growing trade deficits with its major trading partners, soaring inflation, and high 
unemployment. The prolonged 1981-1982 recession also stunted economic growth and left the 
 
1 Department of External Affairs (Canada), A Review of Canadian Trade Policy: A Background Document to 
Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s (Ottawa: Minister of Supply Services Canada, 1983): 20-21.  
2 Donald S. Macdonald (Chairman), Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for 
Canada, Volume One (Ottawa: Minister of Supply Services Canada, 1985): 247.    
3 James F. Kelleher and Department of External Affairs (Canada), How to Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to 
Export Markets (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1985): 6-7.   
Reagan administration, Congress and American public concerned about the future of the US 
economy.4   
 The upshot of America’s state of economic malaise was a policy shift back to more 
“protectionist” trade laws and practices to help shield damaged American industries from the 
perceived “unfair” trading practices of their competitors. In the 1970s and 1980s, existing US 
trade laws helped the government attempt to limit the competitive advantage of its foreign trade 
partners. The Anti-Dumping Act (1921), Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930), Buy America Act 
(1933) and Trade Act (1974) allowed the government to impose both tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) on foreign competitors and their products. Many of these barriers were sanctioned by the 
GATT.5 The threat of US protectionist sanctions, tariffs, and general sentiments created a 
climate of uncertainty in Canada, given its overwhelming economic dependence on the US 
m .   
 Anxiety surrounding American protectionism in Canada during the 1980s decisively 
influenced the development and eventual shift in Canadian trade policy from the Trudeau to 
Mulroney governments. The apparent danger of US protectionism for Canada’s overall export 
economy was a fundamental premise upon which the Mulroney government pursued a
trade pact with the US. A lively debate in Canada about the perceived dangers of US 
protectionism ensued from 1983 to 1988, including commentators in government, academia and 
arket
 bilateral 
                                                 
e 
nce, Second Edition, 1985-2000 (Ottawa: Department of 
4 Stephen Clarkson, Canada and the Reagan Challenge (Ottawa: Canadian Institute For Economic Policy, 1982): 
116-117.  
5 Clarkson, Reagan Challenge, 119-123; Rodney de C. Grey, United States Trade Policy Legislation: A Canadian 
View (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982); Department of Foreign Affairs (Canada) and Mik
Robertson, U.S. Trade Remedy Law: The Canadian Experie
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Trade Remedies Division, 2002). This work provides a comprehensive 
outline of various US trade remedy laws. See pages 1-67.  
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6    
 In 1982 the Department of External Affairs (DEA), under the direction of Ed Lumley, 
Minister of State (International Trade), began an extensive review of Canada’s trade strategies 
anticipate Canada’s future economic vitality, with a special focus on international trade.7 The 
Review of Canadian Trade Policy, released the following year, reminded Canadians that “full 
and active participation in international markets is the key to Canada’s further economic 
development.” 8 It referred back to Canada’s large dependence on exports which accounted f
over 30 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP).9 Macroeconomic conditions charac
by a long, drawn-out recession, over inflated economy, levels of record unemployment, and 
subsequent increases in global protectionist pressures, were cited as severe threats to the 
international trading system.10 The chapter dedicated to foreign market access indicated that
tariffs had been reduced through the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-9) to reasonable levels, and 
therefore did not represent a large impediment to Canadian exporters into the US. With the 
exception of a few highly protected industries (such as textiles, footwear and clothing), it no
“the average tariff on dutiable manufactured exports to the United States will by 1987 be aroun
5.7 percent…. The tariff is not a significant barrier for most of our current exports.”11 Free 
access for automotive parts through the 1965 Auto Pact helped Canadian manufacturers
 
6 Chapter 1 does not examine the formal negotiations in detail. Its primary focus is US protectionism from 1982-
rek H. Burney, Getting It Done: A Memoir (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005): 
view, foreword.  




9 Ibid, 3.  
10 Ibid, 1.  
11 Ibid, 153, 154.  
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tariff-free market share in the US. However, the report cited high tariffs on Canadian 
petrochemicals and rolling rock as stifling to those particular sectors of the economy.12 
 Although protective tariffs were not interpreted as a severe threat to US market ac
the Review concluded that “Buy America” and “Buy National” programs – which represente
significant NTBs – were problematic. For example, the Surface Transportation Assistance Ac
1982 legislated that state and municipal governments had to give special preference to US 









 further encourage 
protectionist pressures- undoing some of the trade liberalization of the past three decades and 
                        
13 In the Review’s final
NTBs were identified as major impediments to Canadian exporters.  They sometimes caused 
Canadian firms to set up production in the US to bypass NTBs.14 In this light, US protectionist 
measures represented an apparent threat to not only Canadian exporters, but to Canadian 
domestic investment as well.   
 The Review cited the possibility of additional US protectionist measures as a growing 
concern. This was perceived as creating a climate of uncertainty for Canadian exporters, while 
also subjecting them to even more American NTBs, restricting Canada’s access to the US 
market. The DEA believed that the US Administration was vulnerable to protectionist
as a result of pleas from constituents, senators and members of Congress. “The susceptibility o
Congress to protectionist pressures results in much protectionist draft legislation which, even if 
resisted by the Administration…can contribute to a climate of uncertainty,” it noted.15 The DE
also anticipated slow economic growth in the 1980s, which “could
                         
al Affairs (Canada), Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s: A Discussion Paper (Ottawa: 
pply Services Canada, 1983): 28.  
12 Ibid, 154, 155.  
13 Ibid, 154, 155. 
14 Department of Extern
Minister of Su
15 DEA, Review, 155.  
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thereby lowering real incomes.”16 Existing American trade laws upheld a system of contingency 
protection for American corporations if it could be proven that an American industry faced a 
serious threat of deterioration as a result of foreign competition.17 
 The overall purpose of the Trade Policy Review was to reconsider Canada’s approach to 
international trade and assess the options for increasing and securing export markets, especia
in the US. According to Derek Burney, then Assistant Undersecretary for Trade and Economic






working to ensure that contingency 
ble 
ot 
                                                
18 Nevertheles
particular fundamental themes dominated the discussion. Trade Minister Lumley (who was 
replaced by Gerald Regan in 1983) emphasized that it was essential for Canada “to get th
right with the US,”19 and the Review concluded that Canada needed to seek reduced tariff
non-tariff barriers to promote an increasingly secure and enhanced trade relationship with the 
United States.20 This was crucial for enhancing the profitability of Canadian businesses, 
improving employment opportunities, and achieving economies of scale with its trading 
partners.21 Preserving the relationship with the US meant 
protection adhered to international rules.22 The Review briefly entertained the notion of a 
bilateral FTA with the US, but believed that any such impetus would likely be denied because of 
persistent political worries about Canadian sovereignty.  
 The legitimacy of international trade laws under the GATT accounted for increasing 
skepticism in the Review. The GATT “is showing signs of age,” it observed. “It has been una
to contain and manage the unanticipated proliferation of preferential trade agreements. It has n
 
16 Ibid, 195.  
  
etting It Done, 64.  
dian Trade Policy, 2, 28.  
w, 213.  
17 DEA, Canadian Trade Policy, 28.
18 Burney, G
19 Ibid, 63.  
20 DEA, Cana
21 Ibid, 28.  
22 DEA, Revie
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23 This point was corroborated by Burney, who agreed with the 
characterization of the GATT as a “sheriff without a police force” that had trouble governing 
trade solutions in the 1982 multilateral meetings.24 Under the GATT, member countries w
permitted to impose tariffs or NTBs if imports “cause or threaten serious injury to domesti
producers,” subject to GATT’s principles of non-discrimination and national treatment. 25 Th
1982-1983 Trade Policy Review made several important statements of concern regarding 
increasing American protectionism, the inadequacy of the GATT in limiting protectionist 
measures, and the imperative for Canada to improve its trading relationship with the US. Its 
closest recommendation to a bilateral pact came in the realm of sectoral-agreements in 
sectors, such steel and urban transportation equipment, which faced highly restrictive barriers.2
A comprehensive FTA with the US was not considered a viable policy solution, but American 
protectionism was at the forefront of Canada-US trade policy considerations.27  
 From 1982 to1983, rumblings about increasing US protectionism were not confined 
the DEA’s trade experts in Ottawa. Allan Gotlieb, Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, 
kept a watchful eye on the developing macroeconomic trade scenario between the two nations. In 
his Washington Diaries, Gotlieb recounted that briefing the Deputy Ministers in Ottawa on 
mounting US protectionist sentiments in August 1982 “was like giving them news from Mars
‘The United States is becoming more inward looking and protectionist. This is not an aberra
it’s a long-term trend, based on far-reaching demographic and economic trends.’”28 As the Trade 
 
23 Ibid, 175.  
24 Burney, Getting It Done, 74. Burney noted that this description of the GATT belonged to Roy Denham, the EEC’s 
ambassador to GATT.  
25 DEA, Review, 177, quoted from GATT.  
26 DEA, Canadian Trade Policy, 42-46.  
27 DEA, Review, 239.  
28 Allan Gotlieb, The Washington Diaries, 1981-1989 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2006): 87.   
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Policy Review took form that summer, Gotlieb’s warnings must have been heeded given the 
focus on US protectionism in the document. In Washington, Gotlieb had direct access
plethora of political contacts which he used to gauge mounting trade attitudes. In
about trade with officials in both Ottawa and the American capital, Gotlieb believed Canada wa
in a precarious dilemma: “I analyzed what was happening in Congress, the sweeping 
protectionist attitude, the bills that could damage Canada on uranium, trucking, 
telecommunications and so on.”
 to a 
 his discussions 
s 
le 




warned Canadians that the US protectionist “bogeyman” of the Smoot-Hawley Era was back to 
                                                
29 He recorded in his diary that the Americans wanted a fragi
and divided Canada, and the moods of Congress members were 
deep trouble, as is the United States, as is Canada…,” Gotlieb noted after a dinner meeting
anti-foreign attitude was palpable and made me very uncomfortable.”30 He feared that “neo
protectionism” was growing, rising and perilous for Canada.31  
 The Globe and Mail also reported on key trade policy developments in the US. In 
October 1982, President Reagan signed a trucking law that restricted trans-border trucking 
permits to Canadian businesses as a result of lobbying from American motor carriers who 
insisted that Canadian companies “had been given an unfair advantage in the trans-border 
trucking business since trucking regulations were eased (in Canada).”32 Ambassador Gotlieb, 
unimpressed with this NTB, commented that the law was not only discriminatory to corporations
dependent on trans-border trucking, “but has already cost Canadian companies tens of millions 
of dollars in legal costs and lost revenues.”33 John King, a spirited Globe and Mail commentator, 
 
29 Ibid, 75.   
30 Ibid, 88, 94.  
31 Gotlieb never explicitly described what he meant by the term “neo-protectionism” in his diaries. However, one 
might reasonably infer that he was referring to NTBs as opposed to traditional tariffs, as alternate forms of 
protectionist restrictions.     
32 John King, “Ambassador Criticizes U.S. Trucking Restrictions,” Globe and Mail, 2 October 1982, B16. Author’s 
parenthesis.     
33 King, “Ambassador Criticizes U.S. Trucking Restrictions,” B16.  
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haunt Canada: “Canadian officials are worried by U.S. protectionism, much of which is couc
in terms of ‘reciprocity,’” he noted, “which would have the United States retaliate in kind agains
trade restrictions by other countries.”
hed 
t 






 economic future, led by former Liberal Finance Minister, Donald S. Macdonald, was 
                                                
34 King cited the many protectionist bills introduced in 
Congress throughout 1982 which “are likely to be revived in 1983 that aim directly at blocking 
some of the Canadian exports to the United States, which totaled $55.4 billion in 1981.”35 King 
also quoted United States Trade Representative (USTR) William Brock, a free trade proponent, 
arguing that Congressional protectionism was si
Politicians were looking for a scapegoat for the United State’s trade problems, which ultimately 
created the sweeping wave of protectionism.36  
 Canadian politicians continued to analyze US trade policy throughout 1983. In an 
on economic nationalism, Gerald Regan, new Minister of International Trade, asserted that 
nationalistic policies were inevitable for many countries. Moreover, special protectionist 
measures could and were being used by countries to restrict foreign economic influence.37 Reg
referred to the large US defence procurement of the specialty steel market as a prime example o
US restrictions on foreign imports that hurt competitors. He contended that “there is a great
tendency now to blame our economic woes on ‘unfair’ competition from abroad and to justify 
protective measures by the fact that others are also resorting to them,”38 concluding that 
governments want to avoid a 1930s-like depression they had to resist the lure of protectionism 
against tough foreign competitors.39 Meanwhile, research for the Royal Commission on 
Canada’s
 
34 John King, “Protectionist Bogeyman Making Strides,” Globe and Mail, 23 December 1982, 11.  
35 King, “Protectionist Bogeyman,” 11.  
36 Ibid, 11. 
37 Gerald Regan, Economic Nationalism: An Address by the Honourable Gerald Regan, Minister of State 
(International Trade), to the Bankers’ Association for Foreign Trade, San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 13, 1983 
(Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1983): 1-2.  
38 Regan, Economic Nationalism, 9.  
39 Ibid, 9. 
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ings would have a p
policy.  
*            *            * 
 “Free trade with the United States is like sleeping with an elephant. It’s terrific until the 
elephant twitches, and if the elephant rolls over, you’re a dead man.”40 These words, uttered by
Brian Mulroney during his 1983 Conservative Leadership Campaign in Thunder Bay, Ontario
describe Mulroney’s initial feelings on free trade. “I’ll tell you when he’s going to roll over – 
he’s going to roll over in times of economic depression,” he continued, “and they’re going to 
crank up the plants in Georgia and North Carolina and Ohio and they’re going to be shutting 
them down here.”41 Mulroney illustrated a growing skepticism with Canada-US trade rela
and the potential influence American trade tendencies could have on Canada. Ironically, the 
basic thrust of the protectionist-elephant analogy was later used by Mulroney to promo
stronger bilateral economic ties. By developing a better relationship with the large US economic 
“elephant,” Mulroney promised that the chance of being squashed would diminish.      
 Mulroney’s conversion toward a comprehensive bilateral free trade initiative was gradua
and pragmatic, not ideological. As the Leader of the Opposition in June 1984, Mulroney met 
with US Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige and President Reagan to promote better trad
relations between the two countries, given pending steel legislation restricting steel imports from
foreigners to 17 percent of the US market.42 Mulroney expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
proposed bill to Baldrige, calling the steel import restrictions “protectionist” measures that only
                                                 
40 Peter C. Newman, The Secret Mulroney Tapes: Unguarded Confessions of a Prime Minister (Toronto: Random 
hnson, “Protectionist Policies Harm Canadian Jobs, Mulroney Says in U.S.,” Globe and Mail, 21 June 
House Canada, 2005): 181, quoted.  
41 Newman, Secret Mulroney Tapes, 181-182.   
42 William Jo
1984, 1-2.   
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strained the Canada-US trade relationship.43 After their meeting, Mulroney emphasized to the 
press that millions of Canadian jobs were tied to access to US markets and stressed “Canada’s 
dependence on the United States as a market for exports, hence the need for good relations.”
his meeting with Reagan, Mulroney retained his anti-protectionist position, but created a more 
hopeful mood for the important Canada-US relationship, emphasizing the need for the two 
nations to be both friends and allies.
44 At 






                                                
45 Nevertheless, American protectionism undoubtedly led 
Mulroney to reconsider the C
bilateral pact as a feasible response to US protectionism, the threat it posed loomed in his min
even as Opposition Leader.  
 Soon after being elected into office on 4 September 1984 with the largest majority in 
Canadian history, Mulroney met with Reagan in Washington in hopes of mending the trade
relationship between the two countries. He assured the president that if bilateral issues had been
neglected under Trudeau, they would not be under his leadership.46 The Montreal
reported that, at the meeting, Mulroney “will likely seek greater access for Canada to the U.S. 
market and an end to Washington’s threats to squeeze Canadian imports through 
protectionism.”47 This was not the new prime minister’s essential goal, however. Instead, both 
leaders emphasized the fundamental importance of the Canada-US economic relationship. 
Reagan referred to Canada as “America’s neighbor, ally and most important economic partner, 
and great friend,” much to Mulroney’s approval. 48 According to Derek Burney, 
 
 “Protectionist Policies,” 1.  
liam Johnson, “Operation Charm a Success, Mulroney Winds Up U.S. Visit,” Globe and Mail, 23 June 1984, 
st On Economic Ties With U.S.,” Montreal Gazette, 19 September 1984, A1.   
nada-U.S. ‘Special Ties’ Resurface in Leaders’ Talks,” Globe and Mail, 27 September 
43 Johnson,
44 Ibid, 2.  
45 Wil
1-2.  
46 Terrance Wills, “PM Moves Fa
47 Wills, “PM Moves Fast,” A2.  
48 William Johnson, “Ca
1984, 13.  
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Mulron st, this 
he 
and the 
less-protectionist than the Americans 
g, ever-
.”54 
                                                
ey believed that good relations with the United States were in Canada’s best intere
did not mean that he had an ideological affinity with the US administration.”49  
The 1984 Trade and Tariff Act became US law on 9 October 1984. This gave the 
president power to negotiate agreements reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers with other 
countries. Although Canada was not explicitly listed in this provision, the law was significant 
because it provided the legal basis on which the CUSFTA was eventually negotiated.50 It also 
contained several potentially troublesome protectionist measures, including broader terms for t
US to determine “whether U.S. industry has been harmed by alleged foreign subsidies,” 
right for the US to retaliate if the “right of establishment” was barred from US investments in 
another country.51 Although the Globe and Mail and Winnipeg Free Press claimed that 
Canadians were “happy” with the trade bill because it was 
originally intended and kept open the possibility of negotiating trade agreements, it still 
contained potentially harmful protectionist stipulations.52  
 In late summer of 1984, Mulroney warmed to the idea of an extensive bilateral FTA with 
the United States. A Special Consultants report on an FTA with the US submitted to the 
Macdonald Commission urging “caution in approaching the issue” did not dissuade Mulroney.53 
“Privately, I was beginning to conclude that Donald Macdonald had it right,” he recalled in his 
memoirs. “Canada would have to take a ‘leap of faith’ into free trade. In the ever-changin
shrinking globalized world, I was becoming convinced that we would have to face the issue
Mulroney seriously considered the advice of Donald Macdonald, chairman of the Royal 
 
49 Burney, Getting It Done, 70. 
50 Jennifer Lewington, “Canadians Happy with U.S. Trade Bill,” Globe and Mail, 11 October 1984, 12; Gotlieb, 
Washington Diaries, 252.  
51 Lewington, “Canadians Happy,” 12.  
52 Norma Greenaway, “Trade Bill Pleases Embassy,” Winnipeg Free Press, 12 October 1984, 58.   
53 Mulroney, Memoirs, 382-383. 
54 Ibid, 383.   
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Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. Prior to the 
official release of what came to be known as the “Macdonald Report,” Macdonald publicly 
stated that Canada needed the faith to pursue a bilateral FTA with the United States.55 H
argued, inter alia, that an FTA was the only way to protect Canada from discriminating US trade











                                                
Macdonald similarly concluded that Canadian firms could only compete in the US market with 
an FTA and a new system of negotiating and solving trade disputes between the two countries.
 Mulroney’s position on a comprehensive CUSFTA was also influenced by Derek Burney
Joe Clark, and former Alberta Premier, Peter Lougheed. A paper written by Burney in August 
1984 caused Mulroney to reconsider the status quo trade policy, or “second option” that sought
continued multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) through the GATT and the pursuit of s
arrangements when opportune.57 This reflected the prime minister’s appreciation for Burne
strong work ethic and willingness to consider ‘new’ policy ideas.58 Burney was also a 
continentalist. “What is the price if we don’t proceed?” Burney asked. “Continue to battle 
protectionist pressures in an ad hoc manner;…miss opportunity to forge better foundation for 
predominant trade relationships…rely exclusively on…[the] long-term potential of new 
MTN.”59  Ottawa also regarded the second option deficient because the GATT principle of 
national treatment was being abused by the US (and others) through the increased use of
subsidies, government procurement preferences and contingency protection – discrimina
their very natures. The more frequent use of trade remedies that replaced conventional tariffs was
 
55 William Johnson, “Canada Must Act on Free Trade, Macdonald Says,” Globe and Mail, 19 November 1984, 1; 
“Axworthy Advises Caution,” Winnipeg Free Press, 20 November 1984, 12.   
56 Johnson, “Canada Must Act on Free Trade,” 11.  
57 Hart et al, Decision, 23-24.  
58 Mulroney, Memoirs, 383.  
59 Ibid, 384, quoted. Author’s parenthesis.   
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reinforced by the GATT Tokyo Round, which strengthened the preferential use of non-









      
access and treatment by product and country, making Ottawa’s reliance on GATT MTN an 
ineffective strategy in promoting non-discriminatory trade practices.60   
 Shortly after Mulroney took office, Joe Clark, then Secretary of State of External Affairs
sent him a position-letter on relations with the US which stressed that “we are being driven s
closer to our neighbour by factors we have difficulty controlling. Protectionist sentiment in
United States today is strong and is unlikely to abate for the foreseeable future.” In Clark’s 
opinion, US protectionism was “the single most immediate threat to Canadian prosperity, 
whether we are the intended target or not.”61 Canada’s dependence on access to the US market 
was so important that he identified “securing this access [as] an overriding priority for Cana
economic development.”62 Moreover, Clark maintained that although there was a cordial spirit 
between Canada and the US, it was imperative fo
anxiety over its loss of global trade power, new favourable US trade policies would not appl
Canada unless they first benefited the US.63        
 In 1985, Premier Lougheed’s visit to Washington prompted another strong wave of 
reporting back to Mulroney. After meetings with US cabinet secretaries and Congressional 
leaders, Lougheed emphasized that the status quo “second option” was no longer viable. Canada
was being severely damaged by US protectionism and a CUSFTA held the only solution. He was 
adamant that if Ottawa did not pursue a bilateral agreement by the end of 1985, the opportuni
                                           
, 384, quoted.  
uoted.  
60 Hart et al, Decision, 26-27.  
61 Mulroney, Memoirs
62 Ibid, 384, q
63 Ibid, 385.  
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to do so would be lost.64 Ian Clark, Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council, also advised Mulrone
Washington’s trade mood: “on matters such as steel and softwood lumber, there are signs of





 pleased Gotlieb, who believed that the majority of protectionists, 
unionis
came to 
ephant analogy from his 1983 speech in Thunder Bay encouraged 
and 
                                                
65 Clark expressed 
similar concerns that the Reagan administration was losing its ability to resist protectionist 
legislation, and emphasized that Canada’s opportunity to negotiate an FTA was running short.66 
In Washington, Allan Gotlieb continued to gauge US trade developments. “Canada is
to show signs that it cannot simply stand on the slippery status quo,” the influential Ambassador
observed. “Maybe all my speech-making on the fractured U.S. system, the forces of 
protectionism, the power of special interests….has not been a waste of time.”67 The re-election 
of Reagan on 6 November 1984
ts and lobbyists voted Democrat.68 The Democrats, however, retained majority control in 
the House of Representatives.  
Mulroney did not have an ideological obsession with the notion of free trade. He 
regard US protectionism as a threat to Canadian exporters and a barrier to positive Canada-US 
trade relations. The el
Mulroney to embrace, in a pragmatic fashion, the idea of an FTA to quell the growing threat of 
US protectionism.69  
 1985 was a seminal year for the final push toward a bilateral FTA on both diplomatic 
policy fronts, during which Mulroney and his administration became convinced that they could 
sell the idea of free trade to Canadians. Protectionist worries remained at the forefront of the 
 
64 Ibid, 385-386.  
65 Ibid, 386. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Gotlieb, Washington Diaries, 261.  
68 Ibid, 261-262.    
69 Also see Tomlin, “Leaving the Past Behind.” The Burney and Mulroney memoirs further validate the argument 
that Mulroney pursued an FTA pragmatically as a result of the perceived growth and strength of US protectionism.   
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Mulroney government’s trade policy analyses throughout the year. On 29 January 1985, Ministe
of International Trade James Kelleher released How to Secure and Enhance Canadian Access to 
Export Markets, a discussion paper on Canada’s policy options for securing US market access. 
Kelleher emphasized Canada’s dependence on trade with its southern neighbor (which accounted
for 72.9 percent of Canada’s total exports in 1983), and that “many see success in the U.S. as









                                                
70 Those considerations, coupled with Kelleher’s fear 
of increasing US protectionism characterized by measures in the lumber, steel, copper, fish, 
urban transit, cement and agricultural industries, led the Minister and the DEA to conclude th
the government was prepared to seek new methods of securing access to the U
trying to “define and advance Canadian interests in negotiations.”71 Negotiations were now 
viewed as a feasible way to reduce Canada’s exposure to US protectionism.  
 At the famous “Shamrock Summit”72 in Quebec City on 17 and 18 March 1985, Reaga
and Mulroney met and discussed Canada-US trade policy. Both leaders agreed on the need to
eliminate trade barriers and pledged to combat protectionism in each country.73 Protectionism 
was the central issue of the summit for the Globe and Mail, which reported in its front page 
coverage that “the President reassured the Prime Minister he would use all of his energies to pre
empt any move that would put Canada in peril from protectionism.”74 USTR William Brock and 
Trade Minister Kelleher were also designated to report back to the leaders in sixth months with 
 
70 Kelleher and DEA, How To Secure and Enhance, 7. The US accounted for 72.9 percent of Canadian exports in 
1983, with Japan (Canada’s second largest market) at 5.2 percent.   
71 Ibid, 17, 32.  
72 This two-day meeting came to be termed the “Shamrock Summit” because both Ronald Reagan and Brian 
Mulroney were of Irish descent and because the first day of the conference was held on St. Patrick’s Day, 17 March 
1985. “Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States of America Regarding 
Trade in Goods and Services, March 18 1985,” In Canadian Trade Negotiations: Introduction, Selected Documents, 
Further Reading, Edited by the Department of External Affairs, Canada (Ottawa: External Affairs, 1985): 13-14.    
73 Peter Stoler, “Canada at the Shamrock Summit,” TIME, 1 April 1985. Derek Burney was immune to Reagan’s 
free trade rhetoric. In his memoirs, he recounted that “Reagan also believed in free trade, even though the actions of 
his administration did not always sustain his rhetoric.” See Burney, Getting It Done, 105.  
74 Quoted from a “senior Canadian official.” Graham Fraser, “PM, Reagan Would ‘Halt Protectionism,’” Globe and 
Mail, 19 March 1985, 1.   
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policy recommendations on bilateral trade. The seeds for bilateral negotiations were thus planted
in addition to a pledge from Reagan to reduce Canada’s exposure by revising the 1984 Trade and 
Tariff Act so that Canadian specialty steel could be more easily exported to t
, 




mmended that Canada pursue a comprehensive 
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for job-creating investment. Even where we are not the principal target we risk 
 before Congress.77  
 
The rep S 
market
 to harass their foreign competitors. These 
laws include provisions for imposing countervailing duties against subsidized 
retaliation against ‘unfair’ trade practices, and relief from imports deemed 
 
                                                
Mulroney and Reagan agreed on the fundamental point that restrictions to investment ought to be
limited between the two countries, making way for the eventual CUSFTA.  
 On the policy front, the long anticipated Royal Commission on the Economic Union and 
Development Prospects for Canada final report was released publicly on 5 September 198
Originally initiated by the Trudeau government to assess Canada’s long-term economic viability
twelve of the thirteen commissioners reco
l FTA with the United States.76 The risk of US protectionism was a major premise u
his recommendation was based:  
T
Canada. Any increase in protectionist legislation could hold serious implications 
being the major victim of a spate of protectionist legislation
ort highlighted that dangerous US trade laws were already inhibiting access to the U
, and more protectionist legislation loomed on the horizon:  
The issue is more than a potential threat. Existing U.S. trade legislation already 
allows American companies constantly
imports, anti-dumping duties, emergency relief from seriously injurious imports, 
prejudicial to U.S. national security.78 
 
75 Fraser, “PM, Reagan Would ‘Halt Protectionism,’” 2.   
76 Burney, Getting It Done, 78; Macdonald, Royal Commission, 380-385, See “Recommendations.”   
77 Macdonald, Royal Commission, 247.   
78 Ibid, 247-248; “Canada-United States Trade Negotiations: The Issues and the Process,” In Canadian Trade 
Negotiations: Introduction, Selected Documents, Further Reading, Edited by the Department of External Affairs, 
Canada (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985): 1-4. This document highlights that in 1984, about $6 billion 
of Canadian exports were subject to protectionist measures via quotas, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, 
and surcharges.   
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The Commission rejected the idea of sectoral-based agreements because they might have 
violated Article XXIV of the GATT, which “requires that a free-trade agreement remove barriers 
to ‘substantially all’ the trade between the signatories in order to qualify as a valid preferential 
agreement.”79 Moreover, the Commission argued that a sectoral agreement would not gain m
public approval, and that industries not included in sectoral arrangements would probably resent 
the sector-based agreements as being
uch 





ds already traded duty-free, the Commission 
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ould potentially restrict Canadian access, including discriminatory federal and state 
procurement practices and the implementation of certain US product standards that intentionally
conflict with Canadian standards.81  
Overall, an FTA with the US was deemed the best possible alternative for improving 
Canada’s overall domestic economy. Referred to as the “third option” in policy terms, it woul
facilitate better access to the US market through investment, help rationalize production 
capacities, and boost economies of scale. Although the tariff cuts from the Tokyo Round were
set to be reduced by 1987 and 80 percent of goo
argued that even if 15 percent of all goods were subject to 5 percent duties or less, these 
might still discourage new investment in Canada.82 The Commission recommended bilateral
negotiations, and Mulroney followed through. 
 On the day the Macdonald Report was released, Gotlieb was called to the Prime 
Minister’s Office. A private plane was sent to Washington to pick him up. Once in Ottawa, 
Mulroney revealed to Gotlieb that an extremely important policy decision had been made: 
                   
, Royal Commission, 304. 79 Macdonald
80 Ibid, 305.  
81 Ibid, 315  
82 Ibid, 311.  
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Canada would pursue an FTA with the US.83 On 26 September 1985, Mulroney formally 
announced his intentions to Canadians. In an address to the House of Commons, the prime 
minister emphasized that the best remedy for the problem of ever-growing US protectionism 
“lies in [a] sound agreement, legally binding, between trading partners, to secure and remove 
barriers to their mutual trade. And it is obvious that we must find special and direct means of 
securing and enhancing the annual $155 billion of two-way trade with the United States.”84 The 
Toronto Star reported that “Mulroney warned that Canada’s economy will face a 







                                                
85 and tha
“common sense dictates a need to remove tariffs, quotas and other trade barriers if Canada is to
create new jobs and save its exports industries from the threat of increasing U.S
protectionism.”86 Reducing protectionism was not promoted for its ideological value. It was 
always connected by policy makers to fundamental aspects of Canada’s macroeconomic well-
being in terms of job security, investment, and achieving economies of scale.  
 Mulroney appointed Simon Reisman, former Canada-US Auto Pact negotiator and policy
adviser to Liberal leader John Turner, as Canada’s chief trade negotiator on 8 November 19
The negotiating team had several key objectives directly related to US protectionism. They 
wanted to secure market access through new rules and definitions that limited the application of 
trade remedy laws, enhance access to the US market through easier entry into government 
 
83 Gotlieb, Washington Diaries, 318. Gotlieb wrote in his diary: “I said I welcomed his decision, it was a bold and 
courageous one, and I would work for it with great enthusiasm.”  
84 Brian Mulroney, “Statement by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney on Canada-USA Trade Negotiations,” In 
Canadian Trade Negotiations: Introduction, Selected Documents, Further Reading, Edited by the Department of 
External Affairs, Canada (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985): 73-76. Author’s parenthesis. Mulroney 
also referred to the 1930s as an example of how dreadful protectionism could be and contended that it exacerbated 
the depressive economic conditions. The pursuit of bilateral negotiations, from Mulroney’s point of view, 
represented a resistance to strong protectionist forces. Limiting protectionism was therefore paramount in the 
development of Mulroney’s views on Canada-US trade relations.     
85 Martin Cohn, “U.S. Trade Deal Will Save Jobs, Mulroney Says,” Toronto Star, 27 September 1985, A1.  
86 Cohn, “U.S. Trade Deal,” A1.    
87 David Stewart-Patterson, “Ottawa’s Free Trade Envoy Vows Lean Team,” Globe and Mail, 9 November 1985, 
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procurement markets, and broaden tariff reduction over time. They also wanted legalized access 
to the US market through a dispute settlement mechanism for fair conclusions to differing trad
practices of both countries and a legal agreement that would “enshrine mutual obligations 




on the merits 
and disadvantages of a bilateral pact wi  US protectionism remained a core 
 in 
y 
economic and cultural consequences of tighter ties to the US. Proponents of an agreement 
emphasized the need to improve Canada’s productive capacity and the growing imperative to 
overcome existing and pending US protectionist legislation. In their reasoning, this was the only 
                                                
88 Reisman was also a staunch 
opponent of US protectionism and stressed that the GATT was inadequate in reducing tra
barriers: a belief he shared with Mulroney and DEA.89 So began a national debate 
th the United States.
issue. “The argument over free trade has begun again,” historian Desmond Morton quipped
September 1985, reflecting back to the election of 1911.  “It will not end soon.”90 
*            *            * 
 The Canadian debate leading up to the CUSFTA signed on 2 January 1988 was all-
encompassing, divisive and emotional. News on the negotiations and Canadian-US trade 
relations received front page coverage in newspapers across Canada. The issue preoccupied 
Canadians from East to West, drawing commentary from academics, private sector business, 
labour groups, women’s groups, churches, and Native people.91 The potential benefits and 
burdens of an FTA were heavily debated. Canadians who opposed an agreement were primaril
concerned with the possible erosion of Canadian sovereignty and social values, and the potential 
 
88 DEA, “Canada-United States Trade Negotiations,” 3-4.  
89 Simon Reisman, “Canadian Trade at the Crossroads: Options for New International Agreements, Trade Policy 
Options in Perspective: Address to Ontario Economic Council, 16 and 17 April 1985,” Library and Archives Canada 
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way to increase employment and investment in Canada, and to ensure long-term economic 
growth.92 
 The pursuit of an FTA with the United States was heavily based on the premise that an 
agreement would help secure, enhance and legally bind Canadian access to the US market. By 
extension, the issue of US protectionism frequently arose in the debate. Existing historiography 
has tended to ignore the debate on US protectionism, especially from the perspective of 
opponents to an agreement. Not all Canadians viewed US protectionism as a vital problem that 
justified an FTA. The historiography has implicitly assumed that all Canadians in the 1980s 
perceived US protectionism as a dangerous threat to Canadian economic sustainability. A more 
careful reading of the evidence reveals that it also prompted opposition to an FTA.      
  By late 1985, criticisms of the free trade initiative began to emerge with great force. 
Political scientists Daniel Drache and Duncan Cameron published an edited rebuttal of 
Macdonald’s Royal Commission called The Other Macdonald Report.93 The authors 
immediately questioned a fundamental idea: “Why does Canadian business need guaranteed 
access to the American market?”94 In their view, Canada had the ability to compete for US 
market share just like other countries who sold products to the US in the face of trade barriers. 
Drache and Cameron also reaffirmed that protectionism was a normal part of US political life, 
allowing Congress and the US administration to impose trade remedy law whenever deemed 
                                                 
92 Earle Gray (Ed), Free Trade, Free Canada: How Free Trade Will Make Canada Stronger (Woodville: Canada 
Speeches, 1988). This collection is a good primer on the essential arguments in favour of free trade in “speech” 
format.  
93 “Critics Say Macdonald Report Caves in to Business,” Montreal Gazette, 14 September 1985, B1. 
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necessary or attractive.95 Toronto Star writer David Crane, a critic of an FTA, made a similar 
comment by referring to Deputy Assistant USTR William Merkin, who stated that Canada would 
receive no special exemptions from protectionist US trade law under a potential FTA.96 For 
Drache and Cameron, this meant Canada could “ill-afford to become more beholden to American 
policies and more reliant on the U.S. markets.”97 The threat of US protectionism would not 
disappear with an FTA, so why seek a binding agreement?  
 The Canadian Institute for Economic Policy was also critical of an FTA, and pointed to 
US protectionism as a valid reason to decline an agreement. Essentially, the institute was 
skeptical that Canada could attain any more US market share than it would already gain by 1987, 
after the tariff reductions achieved in the GATT Tokyo Round had been implemented.98 
Additionally, the think-tank was doubtful that an FTA could protect Canada from the large base 
of US protectionist laws. Whether it was “realistic to expect that free trade agreements can be 
negotiated that are insulated from these pressures and the related network of nontariff barriers” 
remained a fundamental worry.99 Drache and Cameron ultimately concluded that the Macdonald 
Commission had sold-out to “big business,” in the pursuit of market access while ignoring the 
potentially negative social, cultural and economic impacts an FTA could have on Canada.100 
 In response to Trade Minister Kelleher’s report on securing US market access, the 
Brewers Association of Canada was wary of free trade. In its cost-benefit analysis of the likely 
impacts of removing existing US tariffs, the association concluded that an FTA would not 
                                                 
95 Drache and Cameron, Other Macdonald Report, xxiii-xxv.  
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97 Drache and Cameron, Other Macdonald Report, xxv; Jack McArthur, “We’re Keyed to U.S. Market Even 
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produce any net gains for the industry. After all, Canadian beer exports only accounted for a one 
percent share of the US market.101 Instead, the association contended that abolishing Canadian 
tariffs supporting the brewing industry would be catastrophic for employment, which could drop 
63 percent the first year of free trade.102 Higher Canadian costs of production and an increasingly 
competitive US beer market deterred the association from supporting free trade. The lustre of 
tariff-free access to the US market did not appear beneficial to all industries, particularly those 
that benefitted from Canadian protectionism.  
 Other commentators anticipated that certain sectors would benefit greatly from reduced 
barriers to the US market. Acknowledging the difficulty in attempting to project the potential 
impact of tariff and NTB reductions, Professor Gilbert Winham at Dalhousie conducted a sector-
driven analysis of tariff reductions on Canadian companies. For fish and fish products, barriers 
imposed on more exotic items such as breaded portions and sticks were substantial, representing 
a significant barrier. The US’s consideration of a CVD against the East Coast fishery “would 
seriously damage the Atlantic fishery, and hence the regional economy as a whole.”103 The 
fishing industry would thus benefit from reduced protectionism. The lumber industry, which 
heavily relied on exports to the US to fund its 30 percent industry overcapacity, faced few tariff 
barriers at the time. It would be only a minor beneficiary of free trade.104 The absence of barriers 
to lumber products would no longer exist within months.     
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 21 and 22 May 1986, the first days of formal free trade negotiations led by Simon 
Reisman and US trade negotiator Peter Murphy, were a microcosm of the entire free trade issue. 
Reagan’s decision to uphold the US ITC ruling that British Columbia’s cedar shakes and shingle 
exports were injurious to the US industry infuriated the Mulroney government and the BC 
lumber industry. The resulting 35 percent ad valorem duty imposed on Canadian cedar shakes 
and shingles, and the launch of a new CVD petition from the lumber lobby seeking injury 
payments of one billion dollars (about one quarter of total lumber exports to the US), represented 
one of the darkest days of US protectionism against Canada in the 1980s.105 By December 1986, 
softwood lumber was resolved. A 15 percent export tax on Canadian lumber to the US was 
imposed in exchange for the suspension of the countervail investigation.106 Mulroney reminisced 
that the protectionist “chill” of 1986 “swept through Congress like a bitter November wind.”107 
US requests for preventive actions against Canadian steel, uranium, subway cars, fish and in 
Mulroney’s opinion, “virtually all… exports south of the border,” exaggerated the need for an 
FTA.108 The Ottinger Bill that passed US Congress 3 consecutive years also sought to destroy 
the Auto Pact, the backbone of Ontario’s economic prowess. 
                                                
 To make matters worse, the US House of Representatives passed another Omnibus Trade 
Bill by a decisive vote of 295 to 115, providing yet more ammunition for US protectionism.109 
The bill was continuously revised until 1988, and contained significant changes to Sections 201 
and 301 of the 1974 Trade Act. Proposed Section 301 changes sought the transfer of authority 
from the president to the USTR in determining an unfair trade practice or a burden on US 
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industry. It would also require mandatory retaliation against unfair trade practices. Changes to 
Section 201 (safeguards measures) suggested easing requirements of proving “injury” and 
reducing presidential authority in imposing import relief in such cases. Numerous provisions also 
sought to make it easier to apply countervail and anti-dumping duties on foreign products. 
Reisman regarded the possible enactment of the bill as a significant impairment to any FTA 
signed; the need for an agreement appeared more pronounced given the pending legislation.110      
 The tariff on shakes and shingles upset Mulroney so much that he confided to Gotlieb 
that “I can’t go forward with the free-trade negotiations.”111 Gotlieb countered that the “whole 
affair demonstrates the necessity of a new trade agreement, with new procedures to resolve 
disputes. The president’s decision shows we need an agreement to avoid unilateral protectionist 
action.”112 Burney also wrote in his memoirs that the shakes and shingles experience drove the 
government’s free trade initiative home. A trade agreement was needed to reduce 
vulnerability.113 Mulroney believed that the shakes and shingles experience helped frame the key 
negotiating strategy for Canada: “The defensive aim of securing existing access to the U.S. 
market became as vital an objective for our negotiators as the benefits to be derived from more 
liberalized, tariff-free access,” he reminisced.114 US protectionist sentiments and measures did 
not subside with free trade negotiations, and seemed to be on the rise. Whether the shakes and 
shingles tariff was a fear campaign or negotiating strategy on the part of the US did not matter. 
The Mulroney government was angered and sought retaliation.115  
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 Protectionist impulses from the US food industry developed in June 1986. American 
farmers filed CVD and AD claims that sought to restrict Canadian imports of beef, claiming that 
$433 million (Canadian) in imports was putting them out of business. Other producers of pork, 
potatoes, raspberries and carnations also filed suits.116 The Globe and Mail reported that 
“countervailing actions have been launched with increasing frequency in recent years.”117 On 
Canadian food alone, the US filed ten new suits in 1986, winning countervail claims for live 
hogs and groundfish, and anti-dumping rulings on raspberries and salt cod.118 Procedural, actual 
and potential countervail and anti-dumping threats were perceived as a growing reality in 
Canada-US trade relations.  
 In the national debate, James Laxer119 termed US protectionism “the stick” that free 
traders used to “beat Canadians with…warning them that rising American protectionism 
threatens Canada’s access to the US market.”120 The strident left nationalist argued that 
Canadian access to the US market was not threatened, as Canada already possessed it. In his 




 than a 
                                                                                                                                                            
121 The majority of Canadian exports to the US (about three quarters), 
accounted for a few sectors.  The largest, the auto sector, was already covered by the Aut
and the fabricated products sector were “no more vulnerable to the whims of Congress
comprehensive trade deal would be.”122 Laxer conceded that the steel industry was subject to 
restrictive barriers, but that a trade pact would not change the limited growth potential in the 
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industry regardless. Trade irritants such as the 1986 countervailing duties on fish exports from 
Nova Scotia, resulting from social and economic subsidy programs in Canada, magnified the 
problem of a trade agreement: the only way to satisfy the US would be to remove the subsidies 
of transfer payments and equalization grants to the Atlantic provinces, which essentially helped 
sustain the industry and regional economy.123 In Laxer’s assessment, the benefits of free trade 
simply did not outweigh the burdens it would impose on troubled industries. When the broad 
range of Canadian exports were viewed in overall context, Laxer argued that most faced little or 
no protectionist barriers. “Turning Canadian society inside out to solve these few cases where 
American protectionism could hurt Canadian producers does not make sense,” he insisted.124  
 Laxer argued that there are always trade irritants between countries which would not 
vanish with a free trade deal. Referencing USTRs, Laxer reemphasized that the US urged from 
the beginning that they would not remove the possibility of using trade remedies to counteract 
perceived ‘unfair’ trading practices of countries.125 Section 303 of the 1930 Tariff Act and 
Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act authorized the use of countervailing duties for subsidized 
products.126 He concluded with the point that the only way Canada could be fully exempt from 
protectionist sanctions was by becoming a part of the United States. In reference to the 300 
protectionist bills before the US Congress in 1985, Laxer argued that most of the bills did not 
have a remote chance of being passed. The nature of US Congressional bills was similar to 
private members’ bills in the House of Commons, he explained: gestures of political expediency 
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that should be regarded as an effort to represent a constituency with little likelihood of 
success.127 
 The Toronto Star reported in July 1986 that Canada was the main trade irritant of the 
United States. Out of 782 international trade bills, about one-third contained protectionist 
clauses. Of these bills, Japan and Canada accounted for the most provisions, with Canada the 
highest as the United States’ largest trading partner in terms of volume.128 Of the 134 bills and 
resolutions that dealt explicitly with Canada, 70 contained protectionist provisions and 10 
threatened to impose CVDs on natural resource products.129 At the same time, 34 bills related to 
the Canada-US negotiations sought to liberalize trade between the two countries. Although the 
Toronto Star frequently criticized the free trade initiative, a featured article by John Crispo130 
reinforced US protectionism’s role in the negotiations. Crispo urged that Canada could not afford 
to lose any access to the US market since 80 percent of our exports went to the US, representing 
20 percent of Canada’s GNP. He also framed the free trade debate using binary opposition: “The 
actual choice facing this country in its trading relations with its neighbour is between freer trade 
and U.S. protectionism. To suggest otherwise is to ignore growing protectionist elements in U.S. 
Congress.”131 As long as the US trade deficit remained large, he argued, US protectionism would 
not subside.   
 Some opponents argued that stronger multilateral agreements would better serve 
Canadian interests. Shirley Carr of the Canadian Labour Congress rejected an FTA and 
emphasized that Canada should pursue freer trade through multilateral GATT negotiations. 
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Canada had become overly dependent on the US market, and should pursue more trade with the 
large Japanese and Chinese markets. Moreover, Carr argued that the Mulroney government had 
tried to sell free trade “on fear: fear that Canadians would find the United States market closed to 
our goods. Instead of a rational multifaceted strategy to deal with this possibility,”132 Canada 
was being asked to place its future in the hands of the US economic sustainability.     
                                                
 By contrast, free trade proponent Richard Lipsey, then senior economist at the CD Howe 
Institute, continued to pound the table on the real threat of US protectionism. American 
unilateralism, or the US as a one-eyed judge in defining what was a fair and unfair subsidy, alone 
represented a significant threat for Canada- not only because Canadian exporters were insecure 
about future exports, but also because firms had strong motive to move to the US. 133 They were 
“already doing that in numbers that are very worrying to Canadian authorities,” Lipsey observed. 
“Surveys of investment intentions show that this exodus is likely to grow dramatically.”134  
 Meanwhile, in an effort to promote free trade to Canadians, trade minister Pat Carney 
touted the idea of increased access to the US market. She argued that free trade would benefit the 
Canadian consumer in terms that the average Canadian could understand and appreciate.135 In 
her memoirs, Carney recalled holding up a package of fish sticks in front of a Vancouver 
audience. Without the high US tariff barriers on fancier fish products, she proclaimed, “the tariff 
barriers will be eliminated and we can make higher value products in Canada, which sell for 
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higher prices and create more jobs.”136 Doing the same thing with a woman’s purse, baby outfit, 
jean skirt and teddy bear, she tried to convince the audience of the benefits of an FTA.   
 On 23 September 1987 the free trade negotiations hit rock bottom. To Reisman’s dismay, 
Canada walked away from the negotiating table for reasons relating to the fundamental Canadian 
goal: getting secured access to the US market. A frustrated Reisman stalled negotiations due to 
the absence of a dispute settlement mechanism, or binding mode of resolving trade disputes 
between the two countries based upon definitions of fair and unfair subsidies leading to trade 
remedies.137 The Globe and Mail quoted Reisman explaining that talks stalled over “access to 
the market, issues that have to do with security of that access, issues that have to do with dispu
settlement.”
te 
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was fundamental to Canada’s pursuit of a bilateral agreement. A dispute settlement mechanism 
was vital.  When the US eventually proposed one, this move was crucial to the completion of the 
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 The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives criticized the FTA, arguing against what it 
perceived to be the exaggerated myth of US protectionism. An Ottawa consultant, Morris Miller, 
believed that the protectionist “bogeyman” had been greatly exaggerated. Miller provided a fresh 
rebuttal in asserting that the United States had no choice but to reduce its protectionist policies. 
For Miller, global economic trends indicated that the US could not continue to increase 
protection:  
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Third World debtor countries rely on the American market to absorb 70 percent of 
their exports. In the case of the Latin American states 90 percent of their foreign 
exchange earnings come from the U.S. market. Shutting these countries out of the 
U.S. market would have the effect of cutting off their capacity to service immense 
debts owed to U.S. banks. Hence, a dramatic move towards protectionism by the 
U.S. would have the effect of setting in motion events with nasty ramifications for 
the U.S. and world economies.140  
  
Miller also asserted that since the US went from being the world’s largest creditor nation to the 
world’s largest debtor nation, Washington would need “cooperation from the world in order to 
extract itself from the current difficulties.”141 He also noted that a recession in the US would 
automatically mean a recession in Canada, with “disastrous effects, creating enormous strains in 
our trading relationship and increasing the damaging effects of countervailing and other non-
tariff measures.”142 Miller believed that greater access to the US market was not attainable, and 
that an agreement would merely integrate Canada with the US more so. US political life was 
defined by politicians who respond to their constituents’ short-term needs. Closer US ties would 
not lessen Canada’s vulnerability.  
 Toronto Star commentator David Crane also suggested several means of dealing with US 
protectionism aside from a bilateral pact. American protectionism was “understandably 
frightening,”143 he acknowledged, but it had to be kept in perspective. Crane pointed out that 
despite the US protectionist bills, “Canadian exports are running at record levels and much of our 
economic recovery since the 1982 recession has been due to a huge growth in exports to the 
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U.S.”144 If the US was as protectionist as the free traders urged, the Canadian economy would be 
in shambles, not improving. Moreover, the US was a “driving force” toward further MTN 
through the GATT Uruguay Round. The US economy depended on new rules with Japan, the 
European Economic Community (EEC), and Third World more than it did with Canada. Crane 
called the protectionist mood “temporary.” Even if the US did pass a severely protectionist bill, 
he highlighted the 1971 example where Nixon put a 10 percent import tax on dutiable items 
which was retracted partly because of pressure from Japan, Canada and the EEC.145  
 Allan Gotlieb would have scoffed at Crane’s assessment. In the Ambassador’s view, US 
protectionism was “still alive and well in the United States.”146 Congress’ initial failure to pass 
the Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987 by Reagan did not signify protectionism’s demise. Other 
existing measures still threatened Canadian exporters. What was more frightening for Gotlieb 
was that while the US economy had “expanded impressively over the last five years”147 and 
unemployment decreased, protectionism and US trade deficits had increased. Another US 
recession would result in more retreats back to protectionism if Canada did not have an FTA in 
place.148 Gotlieb referred to economists’ forecasts that the US would hold back over 30 percent 
of trade using restrictive government measures by 1990, compared to 5 percent of US trade that 
faced regulatory administration in the mid-1970s.149 For Gotlieb, the long-term threat of US 
protectionism was sufficient reason to stick with the plans for a CUSFTA. An agreement would 
help circumvent any future protectionist bills accepted by the US administration.    
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 At the height of negotiations in the fall of 1987, bilateral compromises allowed Canada to 
receive its crucial dispute settlement mechanism in exchange for US demands for liberalized 
access to Canadian investment and financial services.150 With these concessions made by 
Secretary James Baker and Derek Burney late in the negotiations, the two nations struck a deal. 
This large achievement was met with an onerous challenge – Mulroney had to sell the agreement 
to Canada. The 1988 Federal election centered on the already drafted and signed CUSFTA. 
Mulroney’s promise to officially implement the agreement into Canadian law if elected was 
countered by Turner and Broadbent’s proposals to completely abolish the agreement, who 
promised to work hard to “kill the deal, which they say will destroy the country,” the Montreal 
Gazette reported.151 The infamous 1987 Omnibus Trade Bill brewing in Congress (which 
Reagan eventually signed in 1988) intensified the question about the strength of US 
protectionism.152   
  The standard arguments surrounding US protectionism and the CUSFTA continued ad
nauseam. Opposition Leader Turner urged Canada to look to the markets of the Far East and 
Europe because the US did not want free trade, but fair trade: “And by fair trade, they mean fai
to them according to their own rules.”
 
r 
ing 153 Moreover, Turner attacked the Canadian negotiat
strategy, contending that Canada should have “sought a freeze on U.S. protectionist trade 
measures as a precondition.”154 Deputy Trade Negotiator Gordon Ritchie argued that if the 
House of Commons did not pass the CUSFTA, the forces of US protectionism, “which we 
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caught napping this time, will be gunning for us.”155  The day Bill C-130 (which included many 
provisions of the CUSFTA) was voted on in the House of Commons, a chaotic scene erupted. 
Opponents of the deal stood and sang “O Canada” in objection to an agreement which they saw 
as eroding the nation.156 Regardless, the Mulroney-led Progressive Conservatives were re-







                                                
elected on 22 November 1988. The Globe and Mail headline demonstrated the importance of 
free trade in the election: 
de deal.”157 A new c
trade relations had begun.   
*            *            * 
  Fear of increasing US protectionism was crucial in the formation and eventual shift 
Canadian international trade policy from the Trudeau to Mulroney governments. The DEA
analysis of US protectionism led it to reconsider the “second option” multilateral approach 
Canada had been pursuing through the GATT in order to improve Canada’s access to the 
increasingly vital American market. Mulroney’s decision to pursue the third option, a bila
free trade agreement with the US, was not based on an ideological belief in free trade. Ra
grew from changing circumstances and perceptions of US tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
Canadian products, and the proliferation of restrictive bills appearing in an increasingly 
protectionist US Congress. These fears, and an overall climate of uncertainty reinforced by
US’s imposition of trade barriers prior to and during negotiations with Canada, propelled 
arguments that promoted an FTA. The success of the 1965 Auto Pact also highlighted the 
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possible benefits of a liberalizing agreement. Furthermore, the international trend toward 
protectionism of the 1980s, with increased trade barriers from the US, to Europe and the Pacific
Rim, forced Ottawa to reconsider its global trade position as a largely export-driven economy.     
 US protectionism also influenced Canada’s negotiating strategy. The main goals of 
securing, enhancing and legally binding the reduction of tariffs and NTBs were so crucial tha
Reisman halted negotiations when the US failed to propose a dispute settlement mechanism
element perceived as essential for solving trade friction between the two countries as a 
conflicting defin
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sought full exemption from US trade remedies in negotiations. Reisman was not willing to
surrender Canada’s own trade remedy laws and therefore could not request that of the 
Americans.158  
 The overarching national debate on free trade throughout 1985 to 1988 frequently 
addressed US protectionism. Proponents and critics of an agreement looked at the state of US 
trade politics and policy and arrived at different conclusions. Many critics, whose points of vi
have been missing in the historiographical debate, considered American protectionism a genuine
threat that proved Canada should look elsewhere to expand its trading relationships. Other criti
deemed US protectionism a temporary political phenomenon, exacerbated by the 1981-1982 
recession, that had no impact on the roughly 80 percent of goods that already flowed tariff-free 
from Canada to the US. Proponents of free trade urged that US protectionism was
te reat but a long-term reality that diverted investment from Canada and stifled Canada’s 
future prosperity. Canada was inevitably dependent on the large US market and vulnerable to US 
economic conditions and policies. Free trade offered the only secure insulation.  
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 The agreement’s critics failed to appreciate that Canada did not possess a crystal bal
the future of US trade politics or sentiments and thus could not predict the extent of protection in 
any new legislation. Reagan had conceded to Congressional protectionism in the softwoo
lumber and cedar shakes and shingles cases which strained his amiable relationship with 
Mulroney. More so, it demonstrated that protectionist forces were indeed strong enough to 
overcome an administration ideologically committed to free trade. The protectionist “bogeyman” 
was not a complete fabrication. On the other hand, free trade proponents always framed 









uld have been made on any of those products. Canada still remained 
 1980s. 
on Yeutter eventually said of the CUSFTA: “We’ve signed a stunning new pact with 
of US trade remedy laws. Regardless, Canada would not have reduced its vulnerability to the U
by rejecting an agreement (as some critics suggested), as long as the two nations continued to 
trade as the world’s largest partners. The two economies had been highly connected for years
prior.  
 Opponents who argued that an agreement was not needed because 80 percent of goods 
already traded tariff-free between the two countries ignored the fact that new counterv
anti-dumping claims co
vulnerable to future trade remedies on previously unrestricted trade. The increase of US trade 
actions taken in 19 out of 44 trade remedy investigations against Canada between 1980 and 1987 
contributed to an eroding trade relationship and further demonstrated the need for an 
agreement.159               
 The protectionist ghosts of the 1930s haunted Canada and the United States in the
USTR Clayt
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Canada…the Can e sucked into 
e Am
adians don’t know what they’ve signed. In twenty years they’ll b
th erican economy!”160 Whether Yeutter believed his country’s protectionism was just a 
temporary or long-term phenomenon would be crucial in contextualizing this evocative 
statement.   
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Chapter 2: Fortress America? The US Perspective  
 
 In a 1983 radio address, Reagan emphasized that the “freer the flow of world trade, the 
stronger the tides for economic progress and peace among nations.”1 When leaders disreg
fundamental principle, Reagan argued, they attempt to protect their domestic economies by
erecting trade barriers. Instead, they hurt industry as other nations are inclined to do the same – a 
cycle which ultimately stifles world trade and economic growth. Reagan and many other 
A ans believed the Great Depression was worsened by protectionist barriers imposed by
foreign trade partners which closed markets and stagnated the global economy.2  
 During the 1980s it became increasingly difficult for the Reagan administration, and 
particularly the US Congress, to adhere to the principles of free trade and anti-protectionism. 
Increasing competition from the Pacific Rim and expanding trade deficits with the US’s larg
trading partners contributed to rising imports and decreasing exports. Declining productivity in 
key industries and an overvalued US dollar exacerbated export competitiveness in the 198
Products of US firms became more expensive due to the dollar’s strength, raising th
global consumers. US domestic consumption of imports also increased as imports became 
cheaper.3 In 1986, the US trade deficit amounted to $170 billion: about four times the d
1980. Between those years, exports also declined 2 percent while imports increased 51 percent. 
The US manufacturing sector was hit hardest, sliding from a $17 billion surplus in 1980
deficit of $145 billion in 1986.4 These numbers did not just represent movement of capital, but 
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 practices of its partners. The continuous tug-of-war between 
liberalization and protectionism charac de policy in the 1980s. 
’s pursuit 
                                                                                                                                                            
trade from 1945 to 1975 was challenged by critics who questioned if it was in America’s 
domestic interest to risk industry sustainability for the benefit of its trading partners while 
Americans lost jobs. Ironically, the US willingness to feely allow the vast majority of imports in
prompted the re-emergence of protectionism as a viable and defensible position in Washington.  
 Despite these ominous economic conditions, the Reagan administration continu
actively pursue bilateral trade negotiations with Israel (culminating in the 1985 US-Is
China, Hungary, Taiwan, and Canada. The reduction of trade barriers was additionally sought in 
the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-9).5 However, worries about the state of US competiti
increased in the 1980s. Although the US economy gradually recovered from the 1981-1982 
recession, trade problems intensified. Washington often pursued MTN in an attempt to eliminate 
the perceived unfair trading
terized American tra
 The historiography has made significant claims about the growing and perilous threat of 
US protectionism in the 1980s, but has not supported these assertions using American 
documents. Because Canadian fears of American protectionism were crucial in Canada
of a bilateral pact, the threat of US protectionism must be evaluated from an American 
perspective. This strengthens conclusions about the validity of the premise that a bilateral pact 
was needed to ensure future competitiveness and secure Canadian access to the US market. 
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Quorum Books, 1987): 12-13.  
5 C. Fred Bergsten and William R. Cline, “Trade Policy in the 1980s: An Overview,” In Trade Policy in the 1980s, 
Edited by William R. Cline (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1987): 59.  
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American perspectives on domestic trade policy help solidify claims about the influence and
importance of American trade policy for Canada.   
 American media and government documents confirm Canadian assertions that US 
protectionist sentiments and policy measures existed and thrived in Washington throughou
1980s. The Reagan administration, philosophically in favour of free trade, put in place variou
protectionist barriers while rejecting others as being too protectionist. US sources also reinforc
the distinction between the threat of protectionism and the realized implementation of 







from protectionist laws devised in the 1920s and 1930s. Section 201 of the Trade Act, addressing 
 
Congressional protectionism, which often diluted the restrictiveness of new trade legislation. The
sources also emphasize a strong support for liberalized trade despite diminishing US 
competitiveness. Although Congressional protectionism was not strong enough to avert the 
signing of the CUSFTA, certain protectionist demands were met before Congress voted the 
CUSFTA into law.            
*            *            * 
 American anxiety about its international competitiveness, and the protectionist senti
and legislation that followed, were not new developments in US trade policy. The 1974 Trade 
Act represented a shift toward utilizable contingency protection measures that allowed 
beleaguered industries to seek import relief on a comprehensive basis, stemming conceptually 
escape clause mechanisms, allowed the US to conditionally restrict imports from any foreign 
6exporter if the US ITC determined that various standards of injury were met.  Section 301 of the
                                                 
6 Stephen L. Lande and Craig VanGrasstek, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Trade Policy in the Reagan 
er, Diane T. Berliner and Kimberly Ann Elliot, 
ection in the United States, 31 Case Studies (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1986): 7.   
Administration (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1986): 16; Gary C. Hufbau
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Trade Act gave the president authority to retaliate against “unfair” subsidies in order to put 
pressure on countries during trade negotiations.7 These laws, in addition to restrictive measures 
in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and Anti-Dumping Act, allowed the US government to im
CVDs and anti-dumping duties (ADs) on foreign products. This provided plenty of
ammunition for US domestic protection. From 1978 to 1981, the ITC took up on average 93














          
8 Various 
American industries sought protectionist sanctions prior to Reagan’s presidency. The bas
toward protection was not particularly new in the 1980s. Rather, it intensified from 1975 to 19
 A Senate Finance Committee and International Trade Conference in 1980 examined t
US’s position in the global marketplace. The dismal trade situation was of utmost concern. “Our
trade position has weakened considerably, with deficits appearing even in manufactured goods
it observed. “Our share of global exports…is now one-third of what it was two decades ago.
national poll a
c itiveness would take years to reverse.10 The overall consensus was that, in order for the 
US to remain competitive, it must seek to increase exports in an aggressive fashion.11 One 
conference seminar also indicated that the weakened position of US trade was partly caused by
“more favorable government incentives to industries in other countries compared to the United 
States” and “tariff and non-tariff barriers in some significant markets for U.S. exports in certa
                                                                                                                                                   
t that 
“trade relief serves the national interest more than adjustment assistance or, indeed, no relief at all.” (7)   
7 Lande and VanGrasstek, “The Trade and Tariff Act,” 18. This provision could have been used to justify the trade 
actions against Canada on the first day of formal negotiations. To my knowledge, however, it was not used.  
.   
ong (Chairman-Finance) and Abraham Ribicoff (Chairman, International Trade), “Conference on U.S. 
ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980): iii.  
If the International Trade Commission (ITC) agrees with industry, the industry must then persuade the presiden
8 Ibid, 16-18
9 Russell B. L
Competitiveness: Can the United States Remain Competitive?” The Proceedings of the Conference on U.S. 
Competitiveness, April 1980 (Washing
10 Long and Ribicoff, “Conference on U.S. Competitiveness,” iv.   
11 Ibid, 2.  
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sectors where the United States is competitive.”12 Aggressive enforcement of “unfair” trade 
practices and “greater efforts by government in removing foreign barriers to U.S. exports, with







severely undercut by Japan, USTR William Brock criticized Japanese subsidies of its auto 
          
13 were deemed as two crucial policy steps toward improved international 
competitiveness. From a statistical perspective, the value of US imports amounted 
billion in 1975. This exploded to $245.3 billion in 1980. Over that period, US imports covered 
by special tariff and non-tariff protection increased from 8 percent of total imports to 12 
percent.14 This indicated an increase in overall imports and in subsequent protection on those 
imports. Cases of protection in the mid-to late-1970s included book manufacturing, ceramic 
products, canned tuna, colour televisions, orange juice, textiles and apparel, footwear, specia
steel, carbon steel, automobile and motorcycle sectors.15 Protectionist solutions to America’s 
trade ills existed prior to Reagan’s induction into office in 1981 in legal and Congressional 
capacities.    
 The 1981-1982 recession influenced US trade policy developments from 1983 to 1
and exacerbated protectionist pressures. US dependence on international trade was obvious, as 
exports virtually doubled from 4.3 percent of the GNP in 1970 to 8 percent in 1980. By 1981, 
exports accounted for 20 percent of domestic goods production, in addition to “one out o
seven American manufacturing jobs and, including return for investment overseas, $1 out of 
every $3 earned by American corporations.”16 In the case of the auto industry, which had been 
                                       
. Hufbauer and Howard F. Rosen, Trade Policy for Troubled Industries (Washington: Institute for 
r Troubled Industries, 22-23. 
1, IES3.  
12 Ibid, 99. 
13 Ibid, 100.  
14 Gary C
International Economics, 1986): 26.  
15 Hufbauer and Rosen, Trade Policy fo
16 Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Toughening Attitudes on World Trade,” New York Times, 8 February 198
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industry and complained that “if they want access to our market, by golly, they’ll have to allow 
us access to theirs.”17 The Reagan administration eventually imposed stiffer import quotas on 








which sought to dismantle fundamental aspects of the 1965 Auto Pact.19 Fortunately for Can
the bill, passed 3 times through the House of Representatives, never became law.  
 By December 1981, economists’ projections of the recession’s influence on the glo
economy indicated that Japan and Canada would be hardest hit by the US’s shrinking shar
the world trade pie and by increased US protectionism.20 The recession was global in nature, 
which intensified protectionism generally throughout the world. This trickled back into US t
politics.21 Clyde Farnsworth at the New York Times (NYT) noticed the substantial growth of 
domestic protectionism between 1979 and 1982, as indicated by the US Commerce Departm
accusations against Canada and others of competing unfairly. Protectionism also manifested 
itself in steel anti-dumping relief claims because of allegations that other countries were 
subsidizing their exports.22 The US also expressed intense dissatisfaction with Trudeau’s 
National Energy Program and believed the Foreign Investment Review Act was tremendously 
stifling for US investment.23 The Los Angeles Times (LAT) noted that the Reagan adm
was “ideologically dedicated to free trade, but finds itself swept along in a rising tide of 
protectionism.”24 The large $37.9 billion trade deficit and overvalued US dollar hindered US 
competitiveness. However, conviction was growing “that part of the blame lies with the ‘un
                                                 
17 Farnsworth, “Toughening Attitudes.” IES3.  
: Free Traders’ Defeat on Cars,” New York Times, 6 May 1981, D2.  
 York Times, 26 December 1981.  
 February 1982, C9. 
18 Leonard Silk, “Economic Scene
19 Mulroney, Memoirs, 564 
20 Kenneth Gilpin, “U.S. Recession: Effect Abroad Muted,” New
21 C. Fred Bergsten, Trade Policy in the 1980s (Washington: Institute for International Economics): xiii. See 
preface. 
22 Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Protectionism,” New York Times, 14 February 1982, IES9.  
23 Farnsworth, “Protectionism,” IES9.  
24 Ernest Conine, “Protectionism: Sins and Sinners,” Los Angeles Times, 8
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trading policies of other countries.”25 Certain “Buy-Canadian” requirements for US companies 
invested in Canada, without the same requirements on Canadian companies operating in the US
were cited as a major problem and induced calls for further protection.  
 According to the Washington Post (WP), the issue that attracted the most American 
attention aside from taxes and social security was foreign trade. Domestic pressures to subsidize 
industry and labour increased in mid-1982 alongside concerns about US jobs and profits.  
Anxiety centered on Japan – the nation contributing the most to the US trade def
, 
icit. Car 






The WP suggested that idea of free trade did not have massive 
populist support, while protectionism did.  “Free trade is an abstract position, without 
 
elieved that the “Jap
United Auto Workers parking lot in Detroit had a sign that urged its workers to “Park Your 
Import in Tokyo.”26 Pressures on industry aggravated by the 1981-1982 recession intensif
protectionist sentiments, especially in poorly performing industries.27 By November 1982
Reagan imposed import quotas on stainless steel products and other types of specialty steels as a 
result of ITC determinations that imports were substantially injuring the domestic industry.28 
What the WP termed the “steel cartel,” could only be damaging to world growth: “new jobs wil
be scarcer, and pay raises less frequent. Fewer plants will be built, and fewer old ones will 
closed.”29 There was a price to be paid for protectionism.  
 By late 1982, the WP worried that the once celebrated and beneficial ideal of “free
is now in danger of being eroded here.”30 International countries were not only responsible for 
this phenomenon, however. 
                                                
, “Protectionism,” C9.  
Trade Hide Real Issues,” Washington Post, 30 May 1982, F1.   
 to domestic industry, 
ton Post, 20 November 1982, C6; Arthur B. Laffer, “Limits on Trade 
25 Conine
26 “Emotions on 
27 “Steel and Subsidies,” Washington Post, 13 June 1982, C6.   
28 US safeguard law legislates that restrictions are justified if the ITC determines serious injury
pursuant to Section 202 of the 1974 Trade Act.  
29 “Expanding the Steel Cartel,” Washing
Won’t Spell Relief,” Los Angeles Times, 11 January 1983, E3.  
30 “Who’s For Free Trade?” Washington Post, 23 November 1982, A20.  
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enthusiastic mass backing,” it explained, “while proposals for protectionism are all too concr








the apparent evils of protectionism to 
f 
d was 
already on the defensive.36  
                
31 The forces of protectionism were fundamenta
“piecemeal” and benefited from the strong support of business and union leaders who pressed 
government and Congress. The Reagan administration, “under political pressure, does what 
administrations under pressure usually do and has supported protectionist measures.”32 T
expected that, with 1983 as the fourth consecutive year of zero domestic economic growth, “th
pressures will be strong for protectionism.”33 They anticipated correctly. 
*            *            * 
 The 1983 Economic Report of the President to Congress emphasized high US intere
rates and trade deficits. Spiking interest rates caused the American dollar to rise, Reagan 
explained, which made US exports less competitive and imports more attractive. Despite 
favouring free trade on a philosophical level, Reagan was concerned about the prospects for US
exports. The culprit became foreign trading partners. “American workers, business, and farm
suffer when foreign governments prevent American products from entering their markets,” the 
president noted.34 Nonetheless, Reagan emphasized 
Congress: “While the United States may be forced to respond to the trade distorting practices o
foreign governments through the use of strategic measures, such practices do not warrant 
indiscriminate protectionist actions.”35 Reagan anticipated Congressional protectionism an
                                 
olitics and the role of the president within them. 
31 “Who’s For Free Trade?” A20.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Ronald Reagan, “Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Economic Report of the President,” 2 
February 1983, Public Papers of Ronald Reagan [Accessed April 2009], Available online at:  
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/20283a.htm  
35 Reagan, “Message to the Congress.”  
36 See Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985). This book 
provides a thorough and contextual outline of Congressional trade p
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 From 1982 to 1985, the number of ITC trade investigations doubled to 219 cases on 




 the same period. In 1981, the overall deficit with Canada was $6.3 billion. This 
al 
ta 
                                                                                                                                                            
37 The trade offensive was a growing concern to not only Washington, but the 
general public. A May 1983 LA Times Poll suggested that 60 percent of Americans supported 
new tariffs against Japan, “even though they acknowledge that they enjoy the benefits of 
Japanese products.”38 The nationwide poll also indicated that 68 percent supported trade 
restrictions to protect American corporations and jobs, “while only 26% favor free trade as a way 
to hold down prices and permit consumers the widest buying choices.”39 The LAT concluded that 
public protectionist sentiments were so strong that it was willing to bear any negative effects that 
protectionist measures might have on them. Additionally, the poll calculated that 76 percent of 
households with a labour union member favoured trade restrictions. It also indicated more 
American resentment toward Japan, the US’s largest trading partner after Canada, and blam
Japanese competition for America’s economic woes.40 US trade deficits with Canada were 
smaller during
figure doubled by 1983, however, to $13.9 billion.  
 Protectionist sympathies in Congress heated up by March 1983, according to the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ). The notion of free trade was under sustained attack from the gener
populace pressuring Congressional representatives. Republican Bill Frenzel of Minneso
 
The Congress and president regulate, through different means, foreign trade through legislation and the pursuit of 
Deficit of the 1980s, 18-19. This statistic suggests that not only were 
 those years, but even more often as annual investigations on 
more than doubled.  Determining the cause of this is difficult. Nevertheless, the deepening tail end of the 
ct.   
in U.S. Back Tariff Against Japanese Goods,” Los Angeles Times, 22 May 1983, 1.   
9.3 billion deficit as 
ted $21.9 billion to Japan.  
new trade agreements.  
37 Carvounis, The United States Trade 
protectionist sanctions sought after frequently in
average 
1982 recession and growing trade deficits appear to be logical causes. Quantifying “protectionism” as a whole is a 
complicated task, however, these statistics probably represent the best numerical method of gauging its impa
38 Tom Redburn, “60% 
39 Redburn, “60% in U.S. Back Tariff,” 1, 28.   
40 Ibid, 28. In 1981 the US had a $15.8 billion trade deficit with Japan. By 1983, the US had a $1
it imported $41.2 billion and only expor
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stressed that “protectionist pressures are waxing hot… We’ll see if the administration, which 
seems strongly committed to free trade, can hold off on Congress, which seems deeply 
committed to protectionism.”41 Expressed concerns about trade policy were no longer limited to 
law firms and the ITC and Congressional trade committees. According to Barbara Kennelly (D-
Conn), “The individual citizen is asking us to do something…because the country’s trade







upcoming 1984 presidential race also kept Reagan administration strategists attuned to 
ey consider to 
42 “Buy America” bills were put forward in C
a daily. A free trader exclaimed that it was “a significant problem; we simply can’t keep up
with them all.”43 Senator John Danforth of Missouri, a committed free trader, even proposed n
“reciprocity” legislation. This called for US retaliation against countries that restricted US go
and services. Danforth faced pressure from his home state, “where the protectionist United 
Workers union holds considerable sway.”44 There were also increased efforts to convince 
Congress to revamp the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program, designed to “compensate 
workers hurt by foreign competition and thereby to reduce labor pressure for protectionist 
measures.”45  
 Free traders and protectionists in Congress desired a tougher trade policy on the 
international front. “Congress wants some unilateral U.S. actions that will jolt other countries 
into opening their markets and ending subsidies to exports,” one journalist noted.46 The 
protectionist feelings so that they would not appear “too weak in battling what th
                                                 
41 Quoted by Robert W. Merry, “Congressional Anger on Free Trade Could Lead to Some Major Changes,” Wall 
d training support. 
Street Journal, 17 March 1983, 29.   
42 Merry, “Congressional Anger,” 29, quoted.   
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. The Chicago Tribune also believed protectionism was increasing in the US. See “Winds of Protectionism,” 
Chicago Tribune, 24 April 1983, J2; James Bovard, “The Paranoia of Protectionism,” Chicago Tribune, 16 
December 1983, D23.  
45 “Buying Off Protectionism,” Washington Post, 14 September 1983, A20. The Reagan administration objected to 
the program, however, and instead requested $200 million for job search an
46 Merry, “Congressional Anger,” 29.   
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be unfair trade practices.”47 One of the administration’s first efforts to appear tough on trade was 
to introduce US export subsidies on American flour and to develop a $2.67 billion counter-






rejecting claims by the 
                                                
subsidies and export fund were “simply a tactical ploy to bolster U.S. arguments in talks” abou
unfair trade.48 Reagan’s election opponent Walter Mondale also promised the American 
Federation of Labour that he would increase US trade protection if elected in 1984.49 
 Aside from intense criticisms of Japanese subsidies and import restrictions, the US also 
turned up the protectionist heat on Canada.50 The 1982 Gas-Tax Act invoked additional “Bu
America” laws which required that cement used in federally funded projects be 100 percent 
American-made, unless this would raise project costs by more than 25 percent.51 The WSJ 
reported that US cement producers “aren’t sorry the Canadians will suffer— illustrating the 
sometimes-tender trade relationship between the U.S. and Canada, each of which is the other’s 
biggest customer.”52 Corporate petitioning for a CVD on Canadian lumber also intensified
1983. The weak Canadian dollar made imports of Canadian wood increasingly attractive.53 
Increasing protectionism in lumber was not a cross-industry sentiment, however, as many
companies owned lands in Canada that made the idea of a CVD unattractive.54 The US ITC
that Canadian lumber exports were not significantly subsidized, thus 
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48 Pine, “U.S. Mulling Tougher,”
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50 For US-Japan trade irritants, see Martin Baron, “Trade Barriers: U.S. Is
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United States Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports.55 This was not the last of the lumb
issue. By the end of 1983, the WSJ reported that a “fair wind” was blowing from Canada – a 




torically deifies the free market,” 
e WS
4, 
                                                
56    
 In 1984, the US trade balance continued to suffer. Its trade deficit with Canada spiked
from $14 billion in 1983 to $21 billion in 1984, and with Japan from $22 billion in 1983 to $3
billion in 1984.57 With Germany, it more than doubled in a year, moving from $4 billion to $9 
billion.58 The US’s trade balance with Latin America’s eight largest debtor countries also went 
from a $5.8 billion surplus to a $14.5 billion deficit.59 There were, however, some positive 
macroeconomic developments. Unemployment, for example, dropped 2.5 percent in 1983, the 
biggest one year reduction in unemployment in thirty years.60 Nonetheless, the clamour for 
protection did not subside, especially in terms of subsidy spending. US government subsidy 
expenses doubled from 1980 to 1983.61 Although Reagan “rhe
th J observed, “his administration routinely intervenes in favor of selected firms and 
industries.”62 A total of 125 AD and CVD petitions were filed (73 AD and 52 CVD) in 198
and the ITC and International Trade Administration (administrative legal authority of the US 
Commerce Department, therein ITA) affirmatively supported 56 cases of ADs and CVDs, 
including 10 ADs in effect against Canada.63  
 
55 “Canadians Win,” D1. The final ruling on 24 May 1983 upheld this decision. “U.S. Rejects Lumber Charge,” New 
York Times, 25 May 1983, D22. 





56 “A Fair Wind From Canada,” Wall Street Journal, 7 December 1983, 28.   
57 “Facts Sheet on Trade,” 56.  
58 Ibid; Carvounis, The United States Trade Deficit of the 1980s, 18-19.  
59 Eduardo 
Journal, 1 February 1984, 43.  
60 “Trade Is Aid,” Wall Street Journal, 31 January 1984, 34.   
61 James Bovard, “Soaring Succor for Select Businesses,” Wall Street Journal, 1 February 1984. 
62 Bovard, “Soaring Succor,” 2
63 All stats from the US International Trade Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 36th Annu
Report, USITC Publication 1725 (July 1985): 197-99, 236-245; Lande and VanGrasstek, “The Trade 
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 Support for protection of the weakened US steel industry flared up again in 1984. The 
subcommittee on trade held hearings on industry problems for half the year. The steel industry








a CVD on any country “whose exporte the nation’s natural resources at a 
 
                                                
64 Pressure for import 
restrictions from Bethlehem Steel Corp and the United Steel Workers of America eventually
resulted in an affirmative decision by the ITC on 12 June. The ITC decided that the US steel 
industry was indeed weakened by foreign imports on 70 percent of its product line.65 Instead of 
imposing formal steel quotas, however, Reagan instituted “voluntary” restraints on imports on 19 
September, whereby negotiators from major foreign steel exporters would have to decide with 
the US how much to restrain exports.66 The NYT called this “potentially the most protectionist 
action this Administration has yet taken”67 and reported that Reagan justified the action based o
the premise that the U
page list of “unfair” subsidies to support his decision.  
 Pressures for protection were intensified by the 1984 Presidential election.68 The
called Omnibus Trade Bill was first introduced in 1984, and included intense protectionist 
measures. One provision referred to as “natural resource pricing” would allow the US to impose
d products had used 
cost below the price at which the country exported the resource.”69 This was an obvious threat to
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subsidies” and “downstream dumping,”70 whereby any country that used an imported product to
produce another product and then exported it out (as was often done with items imported into 
Canada) would potentially be subjected to a CVD. The new legislation also introduced th
Equity Act that would let US wine companies file complaints against agricultural producers 
themselves. The WSJ argued that the bill suggested that “protectionism’s pr
 
e Wine 
oponents are turning 
to desp gan 
signed STR 
Brock, cked 
e most extreme protectionist measures, including radical definitions of dumping, downstream 
dumping, and natural resource subsidization. Restrictions on steel were increased, however, to 
Canada’s dismay.   
One liberalizing measure from the Trade and Tariff Act endowed the president with a 
wider and faster authority to pursue bilateral trade negotiations with countries. Reagan 
eventually used that authority to begin fast-track negotiations with Canada.  The thirst for free 
trade still existed in Washington. Not all Americans believed protectionism was the answer.      
*            *            * 
 The Reagan administration’s positions on trade policy had clearly shifted during its first 
four years in power. Early in its tenure, policy officials vehemently opposed import restrictions 
so intensely “that they won a reputation as purist free-trade ideologues.”  Reagan himself 
sive 
erate, shotgun solutions for their competitive problems.”71 On 30 October 1984, Rea
the Bill into law – albeit with fewer protectionist provisions than the original draft. U





vowed to expand and liberalize world trade, fight protectionism, and promote the comprehen
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benefits of free markets. Principles of fairness in trade were not initially a part of his rhetorical 
flare.75 As protectionist bills and feelings increased in Congress, however, the pressure to adopt 
restrictions grew, causing the Reagan administration to reconsider its positions. Political 
expediency prevailed, and his rhetoric shifted. Reagan’s new position was conceptualized as free
and fair trade, not simply free trade.
 
work, everyone has to compete on an equal footing. That 
way, prices and demand go up or down based on the free choices of people; there 
quotas, subsidize manufacturers or farmers, or otherwise intervene in the free 
to work.   
Moreover, he conceded that his government (and all governments) instituted various 
protectionist policies “usually because of domestic political pressure from groups that have a 
vested interest in limiting competition.”  Reagan did not like protectionism per se. He felt it 
resulted in trade wars, more restrictions, and thus less growth. An increasingly protectionist 
Congress and greater scrutiny of the practices of competitive trade partners caused Reagan to 
reconsider protective measures in select cases, like his 1984 decision to institute voluntary steel 
import restraints.    
 By January 1985, the US dollar had skyrocketed a tremendous 41 percent since 1980, 
which, according to most economic analysts, contributed to the $131.8 billion trade deficit in 
1985.80 Washington’s deficit with Tokyo soared from $37 billion in 1984 to $50 billion in 1985. 
      
76 In his memoirs, Reagan explained:  
For the free market to 
are winners and losers…when governments fix or control the price, impose 
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The deficit with Canada increased only marginally, growing 1 billion in 1985 to $22 bil
For the first time in 71 years, 
lion.81 









                                                
geles Times poll, 75 percent of respondents described this as a “serious problem” and 
blamed foreign countries instead of domestic policies.83 Poll director I.A. Lewis claimed tha
demonstrated “that the American public is in favor of the hullabaloo in Congress, and they’re in 
favor of trade restrictions.”84  
 In response, Richard Gephardt (D-Mo) asserted that “now, there is a more unified view
the fact that we’re losing the trade competition, and people want something done about it.”85 
Consequently, throughout 1985 there were 300 bills pending in Congress that sought prote
for various industries, a tangible indication of the sour Washington trade mood.86 This was 
considerably higher than the 180 protectionist bills put forth in Congress in 1984.87 Even the
trade sympathizer and chairman of the Ways and Means Trade Sub-Committee, Sam Gibbons 
(D-Fla), introduced a bill in 1985 to place duties on natural resource products like natural gas 
and timber, deemed to benefit from state subsidies in Canada and Mexico.88 Another surch
bill introduced by Democrats Rostenkowski, Gephardt, and Sen. Lloyd Bentsen sought t
a 25 percent surcharge on countries with hefty trade surpluses with the US or which restrict
US goods.89 Just as Canada initiated the proposal for free trade in September 1985, Reagan 
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believed that protectionism was “stronger in Congress than at any time since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.”90  
The Reagan administration again attempted to quell the protectionist sentiments. UST
William Brock (who later resigned from the position and was replaced by Clayton Yeutter) 
emphasized the growing pressure on Congress to fix the nation’s trade problems. Brock asserted 
that the US’s trade obstacles were partly caused by the speed and strength of US economic 
growth out of the recession. As the economy slowed by the fourth quarter of 1984, however
tough corporate competition became more
R 
, 




bills did not generally discriminate amongst nations (European countries were targeted, as was 
level of frustration all across the country…. People don’t think we’re getting a fair shake 
abroad.”91 Clyde Farnsworth at the NYT characterized the 300 pending protectionist bills and 
overriding Congressional sentiment as bipartisan and “the postwar era’s greatest deluge of 
protectionist legislation.”92 Senator John Heinz (R-Pen) claimed that foreigners were “stealing 
run after run and even carrying off home plate,” which reflected the anti-foreign subsidies vie
which permeated the 99th Congress.93 One bill that sought to limit 36 percent of all
imports had the support of 285 members of the house and about two-thirds of the trade 
subcommittee. Another suggested an across-the-board 15 to 20 percent tariff surcharge on 
everything the US bought from another country. An additional bill proposed to provide any 
injured industry with instant protection without the president’s agreement.94  
These types of bills fluttered throughout Congress in 1985 and prompted many warnin
from the Reagan administration that it would veto any protectionist extremism. Although the 
                                                 
90 Lou Cannon, “Reagan Emphasizes Free-Trade Stance,” Washington Post, 1 September 1985, A4.  
ide of Protectionism in Congress,” New York Times, 4 July 1985, D1.  
91 Pine, “Rapidly Rising,” 1.  
92 Clyde H. Farnsworth, “T
93 Farnsworth, “Tide of Protectionism,” D2.  
94 Ibid.  
 62
Canada, the Pacific Rim, and Saudi Arabia), the Senate voted 92 to 0 in favour of retaliator
measures against the Japanese in March, protesting their “Buy Japan” policies which restrict





refused many US 
 
 partners’ 




Blatant protectionism appeared rampant against Japan. Whether this was aggravated by racial 
prejudice is highly questionable. It is possible that race exacerbated the underlying tra
and thus reinforced anti-foreignism. However, the large deficits and vehement competition from
Japanese corporations came from high government subsidies. Japan also 
exports which further upset Americans.    
 Congress also became frustrated with the Reagan administration. Many representatives 
believed it clung to its free trade ideals too firmly. The WSJ reported that “much of Congress’s 
current anger seems aimed more at the Reagan administration for not stemming the dollar’s rise
or aggressively combating trade barriers.”96 Other business leaders thought the administration 
was overly ideological, which actually caused protectionist pressures in Congress.97 Clayton 
Yeutter’s goal as the new USTR was to stem protectionism while maintaining the 
administration’s basic view on liberalized trade practices. Instead of blaming foreign
trade tendencies, Yeutter blamed the US dollar for the country’s trade deficits, and encouraged 
bilateral trade negotiations with Canada and South Korea in 1986. The Reagan administration 
artificially intervene in world currency markets to deflate the US dollar.98 The president also
sought to toughen his trade policy by setting up a $300 million “war chest” to counter-subsidiz
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American exporters who faced international competitors benefiting from unfair subsidies. 
Additionally, a government “strike force” was assembled to initiate negotiations with other 
countries on their unfair trade practices, and to provide a strong US presence in the GATT to






99 With Yeutter’s 
arrival, the USTR office resumed its critique of protectionism in its international and 
Congressional forms.100 The administration also attempted to eradicate protectionism the ‘old 
fashion’ way: vetoing protectionist bills passed through both houses.101  
 Canada was implicated in the new upsurge of 1985 protectionism. The ITC’s 1983 
decision that there were no significant subsidies for Canadian lumber exporters did not convince 
Congress. Six different bills sought to rectify the perceived injustice. Sam Gibbons’ bill called 
“for a change in the laws governing countervailing duties to punish governments that allow
extraction of natural resources at ‘less than fair market value.’”102 Provincial-owned lumber
costs were much cheaper than the 70 percent privately owned stumpage prices in the US, and 
since Canada exported about one-third of its softwood lumber to the US (representing a huge 
percent of the total US market), the bill sought to put a hefty duty on Canadian lumber.103   
 Actions against Canadian hogs were also taken in various central-states, such as S
Dakota, Nebraska and Iowa. South Dakota governor Bill Janklow had police refuse the entran
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of Canadian cattle trucks into meat plants. According to the WSJ, farmers had been “complaini










 The US trade deficit hit its 1980s peak of $173.6 billion in 1986.109 The American 
 September 1986 it had 
104 Janklow denied that this was an action o
level protectionism, insisting that they were “acting to protect someone or other against the 
antibiotic chloramphenicol, which they say the Canadians use to treat livestock.”105 Othe
hog producers believed that Canadian government price-stabilization policies am
subsidies. This manifestation of state-sanctioned protectionism represented another case of worry 
for Canadian exporters. Uncertain access to the US market worried hog exporters.   
 US sources confirm that 1985 was a crucial year, with surging protectionism prom
subsequent Canadian efforts to pursue bilateral trade talks. The 17 and 18 March 1985 Shamrock
Summit, followed by the Macdonald Report recommendation and Mulroney’s formal decision to 
pursue a bilateral agreement, were based largely on the perceived strength in protectionist 
sentiments and legislative rancour.106 Nonetheless, a warm relationship developed between 
Mulroney and Reagan at the Shamrock Summit, which prompted cooperation and friendship, 
two crucial aspects to any positive, diplomatic relationship.107 Front page NYT coverage o
Canadian proposal emphasized that Canada sought free trade because “protectionist sentimen
the United States had been sharply rising, reflected most recently in several speeches by 
President Reagan to blunt even tougher talk in Congress.”108 The path towards the CUSFTA
seemed clear, even as protectionism flourished in Congress.  
go t to lower the value of its dollar was successful, and byvernment’s effor
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decreased 55 percent against the Yen and 40 percent against the West German Mark since the 
government initiated the program.110 Nevertheless, the US trade deficit did not decline, 
prompting Secretary of the Treasury James Baker to urge both West Germany and Japan to 







quadrupled from 1980 to 1986, and protectionist tensions had grown apace.112   
 After Reagan asked for legal permission on 10 December 1985 to negotiate an agreem
with Canada under the fast-track negotiating process pursuant to Section 401 of the 1984 Tra
and Tariff Act, the Subcommittee on Trade of the Ways and Means Committee accepted 
corporate testimony on thoughts of free trade negotiations.113 Much of the testimony focused on
disapproval of Canadian subsidies and duties on US products. For example, the American Paper 
Institute believed that Canadian duties on US products were higher than vice versa, and sought to
eliminate duties in addition to Canadian federal and provincial subsidies to pulp and paper 
mills.114 The US Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports issued the standard argument against the 
Canadian lumber industry, and concluded that any free trade agreement must support the 
“maintenance of existing countervailing duty law, but seek to strengthen the statute through 
adoption of the Gibbons Bill” (which would define any resource valued at less than fair ma
prices as a subsidy).115 The institute asked for a resolution to the lumber dispute as soon as 
possible. Lucy Sloan, representing the National Federation of Fishermen, urged the comm
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that “we need tariffs and countervailing duties” to compete with Canadian subsidies of fisheries
and recommended against any fishery provisions in a bilateral trade agreement.
, 
r 








se U.S. consumers are being 
eoret
116 The Neckwea
Association of America opposed any agreement which could undermine duties and increase 
imports.117  
 Bomont Industries, a producer of nylon 
supported the notion of free trade but firmly opposed “any relaxation of the antidumping or 
countervailing duty laws.” Of particular concern was the reshipment of products from other 
countries through Canada and into the US that benefited from any price or trade distorting 
subsidies.118 Essentially, most companies that supported an agreement did not view their sector 
as vulnerable to trade distorting practices or dumping, and those that did, opposed an agreement.
 Citizens For a Sound Economy, a Washington think-tank, supported negotiations to h
fight against “the spectre of protectionism hanging over the world economy.”119 They cited th
agreement’s probable aggregate benefits for the American consumer, employment, investme
access and increased efficiency of domestic production as blatant reasons to support trade talks. 
They also correctly anticipated that the largest obstacles to the agreement in the US would 
from the lumber industry, but rejected the industry’s claims for protection because even if
Canada was subsidizing its lumber industry, American consumers and homebuilders wer
the beneficiaries. “To allow trade negotiations to stall becau
th ically subsidized by Canadian taxpayers would be cutting off our nose to spite our 
face.”120 Raymond Farley, Chairman of the Canada-US Relations Committee of the Chamber of 
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Commerce, indicated the binational group’s support of trade negotiations. They supported the 
effort as long as each country’s trade laws still applied with the presence of an agreement. The 
committee further emphasized the need for a dispute settlement mechanism and the need for the 
greem
ny 
oncerns over low Canadian stumpage prices, suggesting that “until the subsidy 
 they 
 
                                                
a ent to be comprehensive in nature that covered all “trade barriers, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. No practices should be excluded.”121  
 The California Farm Bureau Federation held a more moderate view and insisted that a
agreement should permit “absolutely no allowance for Canadian provinces to regulate trade 
under their own authorities. Compared with individual states in the U.S., Canadian provinces 
have a stronger role in trade matters.”122 The organization “urged caution” in negotiations, and 
even expressed c
issue is resolved, U.S. timber interests are not likely to endorse any relaxation of U.S. trade 
restrictions with Canada.”123 They favoured reduced trade barriers but insisted that free trade 
remain fair and would not support an agreement that allowed Canadian subsidy practices to 
remain intact.124 The Bureau expressed further concerns over Canadian pork producers who
felt were unfairly subsidized, causing damage to the industry. The Canadian Pork Council 
countered that a 1985 countervailing duty imposed on Canadian pork violated the GATT 
Subsidies Code (which permitted purely domestic subsidies), as it was not proven that a 
domestic subsidy directly caused injury to the industry.125  
 Diversified manufacturing giant General Electric supported negotiations because Canada 
was their largest export market, accounting for 11 percent of its total exports. They supported the
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reduction of tariffs because even with the imposition of Tokyo Round tariff reductions, GE stil








             
126 General Electric also suggested that f
trade should extend to the services sector.127  
 Diverse views on negotiations characterized the testimony. Interestingly, there was not a 
large emphasis on the liberalization of foreign investment restrictions in Canada. This was a 
major concession that the Americans eventually sought in negotiations that helped lead to an 
agreement. Vulnerable industries generally opposed negotiations (textiles, lumber, fisheries, 
pork/farming), and efficient corporations generally favoured negotiations. The emphasis on 
trade within free trade was a dominant theme. 
the testimony.   
 On 23 April 1986 the US Senate Finance Committee voted 10 to 10 on Reagan’s request 
for fast-track negotiating authority to begin Canada-US trade negotiations, which permitted th
president to proceed. After “intense, daylong lobbying,”128 it blocked a motion that could have
stalled bilateral trade talks for years. The fact that there was considerable opposition to the 
President’s proposal, however, indicated that half of the senators opposed Reagan’s negotiating 
efforts. Much of the opposition came from protectionist lumber-state senators who “compla
that Canada was subsidizing its exports by charging timber companies a very low fee for the 
right to cut down trees on Government land.”129 For example, during the day-long meeting, 
“lumber” Senator Steven Symms (Rep. Ida) only voted in favour of the motion after receiving a 
promise from the White House that negotiations to solve the lumber issue would be accelerated, 
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including a possible “unfair trade action against Canada.”130 Yeutter echoed this promise of 
prompt resolution to the lumber issue to gain support for fast-track negotiating authority.   
 The next day, Reagan wrote to Committee Chairman Packwood reassuring the senato











131 eliminate Canadian tariffs on exports, and deal with Canadian subsidies it found 
injurious to competition.132 Reagan was aware that he would have to promote the ideals of fair 
trade to enhance and secure political support for Canada-US negotiations, and he promised the 
committee that, if the context permitted it, US law could still be used to protect a seriously 
injured industry from unfair trade practices.   
 As negotiations began, Reagan’s political promise to deal with the qualms of the lu
senators in the pursuit of “fairer” trade practices took precedence. The resulting 35 percent du
on Canadian red cedar shakes and shingles for the first 30 months, 20 perc
months, and 8 percent for the last 6 months came with the ITC’s determination that Canad
cedar shakes “had seriously injured the domestic industry. Up to 99 percent of such imports 
come from Canada.”133 Mulroney was furious, and Canada retaliated by placing new restriction
on US books, computers and semiconductors. This prompted Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass) to 
rethink Reagan’s move. “If you go too far in any one of these steps, you invite retaliation…,” 
Kerry cautioned. “If we’re not careful, we’re going to end up cutting off our own noses.”134 In 
October, a second bombshell duty was imposed on the Canadian lumber industry – a preli
15 percent duty on nearly $3 billion (US) of the annual lumber exports to the US. This also came 
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after the US lumber industry rejected a Canadian offer to put a 10 percent duty on exported 
lumber. This reversed the 1983 decision and, in the view of the NYT, represented “a major 
escalation of protectionism.”135 Stanley Dennison, VP of the Georgia-Pacific Company and 
chairman of the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, even suggested to the US Commerce 
Department that a larger tariff of 32 percent on Canadian lumber was justified. The final rulin
by the ITC on 31 December 1986 kept the 15 percent tax on Canadian lumber. Rep. Don Bonker
(D-Wash), a long time critic of Canadian stumpage practices, still argued that the US would
a disadvantage because “Canadian producers….will retain their advantage in third-country
markets in which they compete with U.S. exporters.”
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 The WP argued that the trade bill prompted the Reagan administration’s 
a 
he 
gratuitous blow at Mr. Mulroney…? There’s no good answer. It was simply driven by panic.”138 
             
136 The softwood lumber and shakes an
shingles issues had, for a long time, been contentious bilateral irritants. Furthermore, they 
revealed that protectionist measures did not come to a halt during free trade negotiation
Mulroney and Reagan had pledged to one another on several occasions.   
 Congressional protectionism continued unabated throughout 1986. The House of 
Representatives passed the second Omnibus Trade Bill (H.R. 4800) on 22 May 1986 with a 29
to 115 vote. The bill gained “fast track” status as a Democratic initiative for the Congressio
elections that fall.137
duties against Canadian lumber; that it made an effort to appear it was getting tough on trade in 
frenzied attempt to limit support for the bill. In reference to the shakes and shingles decision, t
WP asked, “Why did the United States announce this tariff in a fashion that looked like a 
The Reagan administration was quick to denounce the bill as being “in the worst spirit of Smoot-
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Hawley, pure protectionism,”139 and the president made clear that he vehemently opposed
called it “kamikaze legislation” that would cost the American public billions in higher prices for 
products and would precipitate retaliation th
 it. He 






Trade Bill) assumed center stage on the Hill, and the Democratic-controlled House and Senate 
                                                
Rep. Don Bonker argued that “If our trade bill is being called kamikaze, then it is aimed at the 
right targets—unfair trade practices.”141 The proposed Omnibus Bill contained provisions to 
impose mandatory quotas on many countries, including Japan, Taiwan and West Germ
Reagan administration also succumbed to some protectionism on its most irritating trading 
partner, Japan, and imposed an export limit on its exports of machine tools into the US as 
essential for preserving a key US industry142 but in political terms, as an attempt to “deflect 
pressure in Congress for broad protectionist legislation.”143 The protectionist movement had 
such strength that it did not discriminate – many countries besides Canada were targeted.    
 By 1986, Congressional options had been limited to two essential approach
in tional efforts to secure and improve trading rules and increase fairness with competitors, 
or blunt protectionism by force of tariffs, quotas and other “Buy American” policies. The 99th 
Congress would have to again attempt to achieve this balance in 1987, while debating the 
pending CUSFTA.  
 The 1987 trade deficit declined by about $21 billion, but trade concerns still domina
US Congressional politics.144 The Omnibus Trade Bill of 1987 (also termed the International 
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had been expected to bring forth protectionist legislation after the record trade deficit the 
previous year.145 Critics in Canada, however, continued to suggest that Mulroney’s government 
was distorting the threat of protectionism.  
 The mood on the Hill, however, appeared to be tougher on protectionist ideas that year.
An unnamed Congressional staff aid quoted in the WP explained that “Getting labeled a 







ur-su ported amendment to the 1987 Omnibus Trade 
                                                
146 Sen. Max Baucus (D-Mont), a member of the finance committee
believed that “the general mood and tone and tenor this year is going to be less protectionist 
the last, but still tough.”147 The former predictions were partly true. Treasury Secretar
Baker described the general White House mood to Congress: “Our strategy is different than it 
was last year. That’s no secret. We want to work with you.”148 The deadlocks between the 
protectionist Congress and reluctant White House were recognized as inefficient.  
 Congressional attempts to pass strict protectionist legislation in 1987 were largely led b
Richard Gephardt. His strongly US labo p
Bill required any country with a large trade surplus with the US (particularly Japan, Taiwan, 
South Korea and West Germany) to reduce barriers by 10 percent a year or face US duties, 
import quotas, or other restrictions.149 The House passed the Omnibus Bill late April 1987 
(without the Gephardt amendment) by a vote of 290-137. With the Gephardt amendment vote, 
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the Omnibus Bill slipped through the House by four votes, 218-214.150 Nevertheless, Gephardt 
believed that the Reagan administration would not adopt the bill’s amendment, even if it passed 
through the Senate.151 The House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Rostenkowski also 
proposed a less stringent outline for the president, which provided the administration with the 
flexibility to decide if retaliatory measures were justified should negotiations with high surplus 
countries lead nowhere.152 Authority for this was taken from the president, however, and giv
to the USTR in the Rostenkowski provision.
en 
 that, by its account, violated workers’ rights.154 Reactions to the Gephardt 
mendm
o pass a bill,” he explained. “If we begin 
                                                
153 Furthermore, the US would be able to retaliate 
against countries
a ent were mixed. Rep Mike Synar (D-Ok) voted against it because he felt the 
administration had already developed a more aggressive trade policy to appease Congress. He 
also wanted a bill that would satisfy Reagan.155 Even without the Gephardt amendment, the 
original Omnibus Trade Bill contained certain mandatory retaliation conditions against countries 
that had large trade surpluses, in addition to significant changes to countervail and safeguards 
trade laws, as discussed in Chapter 1.    
 Rostenkowski felt that he had to change his bill simply because he wanted it to pass and 
gain Reagan’s acceptance. “I want to get enough votes t
this journey and there’s no possibility that the president would approve, that’s too much of a 
stumbling block.”156 Thus, the bill was amended to limit the president’s power in determining 
the type of retaliation imposed against nations with surpluses, and outlined a general role for the 
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USTR to initiate more bilateral negotiations to remove trade barriers.157 A changed provisio
workers’ rights also allowed the administration to give a country the opportunity to improve its 
workers’ rights provisions prior to retaliation. Chairmen Gibbons and Rostenkowski believed 
that Congressional bills without the president’s support, at this stage in the trade dilemma, were
futile. Efforts were made to gain approval from Reagan who (alongside Secretary of Commerce 
Malcolm Baldrige) threatened to strike down the various House and Senate bills on several 







st 1987 indicated that 
S. 
ave to 
ion.158    
 Amidst the protectionist Omnibus Trade Bill, bilateral negotiations towards a CUSFTA 
continued. From Washington’s perspective, Ottawa’s basic goal of attaining greater immunity
from US trade remedy law would be tough to concede, given Congress’ determination to
against unfair trade practices. Rumblings from the trade committee in Augu
Congress was “unlikely to go along with a free trade pact that allows Canada to get around U.
unfair trade laws.”159 Sen. John Danforth believed that “if there were an agreement that 
circumvented American laws…there would be a real problem in the U.S. Senate and the Senate 
Finance Committee…I certainly would oppose it.”160   
 During the free trade debate in Canada, many critics believed that the US would sign any 
agreement because they were the larger economic power and had less to lose from a trade pact. 
This was far from the case. The negotiators recognized that any Canada-US FTA would h
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benefit both sides. The FTA would also have to please Congress itself in order to make the 
agreement law, pursuant to the fast-track negotiating provision of the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act. 
Under the fast-track provisions, Congress’ ability to make amendments to the agreement was 
surrendered.161 It was no surprise when the US was reluctant to budge on Canada’s request for









                                                
162 As the WP explained, “Canadians want assurance that free trade 
doesn’t mean endless guerilla warfare against Canadian producers in American courts.”163   
An agreement in principle was finally reached on 4 October 1987. On 2 January 1988, 
Reagan signed the official text. A few days later, he praised the agreement in a radio address: 
have no doubt that history will prove this agreement a boon to both our peoples… the path to 
economic growth, job creation, and security is through negotiation and cooperation,
protectionism.”164  Now he would have to secure Congressional approval.  
 US Trade policy considerations in 1988 revolved around two fundamental issues: 
back and forth revisions and voting of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, and 
the Reagan administration’s attempt to gain House approval of the newly signed CUSFTA. 
in 1988 Reagan threatened to veto any trade bill which he believed contained provisions that 
restricted overall trade between the US and its trading partners: “My veto pen remains re
available if the final work product of the conference remains antitrade, anticonsumer, antijob and 
antigrowth,” he threatened.165 Reagan also rejected the Gephardt amendment because he 
believed American exports were improving and that proposed retaliation would stunt that 
 
161 “Free Trade—And Risk—With Canada,” Washington Post, 24 August, 1987, A14.  
25 September 1987, A24.  
uary 
/speeches/1988/010988a.htm 
arch 1988, D10.  
162 “Canada Walks Out,” Washington Post, 
163 “Canada Walks Out,” A24.  
164 Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement,” 9 Jan
1988, Public Papers of Ronald Reagan [Accessed April 2009], Available online at: 
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives
165 Quoted by Stuart Auerbach, “President Cautions Hill on Trade,” Washington Post, 12 M
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growth.166 The bill eventually passed the House but was vetoed, as promised, by Reagan on 24 
May 1988. Interestingly, his message to the House on why he rejected the bill did not conta
reference to the Gephardt amendment. He focused instead on the bill’s provision that required 
companies to give workers a mandatory notification of plant closings or layoffs, which would 








investigations of unfair trade and retaliatory authority if other nations did not reduce barriers, and 
established a $1 billion dollar skill retraining program for workers who lost their jobs due to 
167 Reagan disliked other perceived disincentives of the bill, including 
restrictions on the export and transportation of Alaskan oil, a change in the Trading With The 
Enemy Act that inhibited the president from blocking enemy propaganda, and the creation of 
Council of Competitiveness to address US export strength because it adhered too strongly to 
special sectoral interests. He was more optimistic on the new draft of the bill, however, because 
he believed most of the overtly protectionist aspects of the bill were eliminated.168  
 Finally, on 23 August 1988, Reagan signed a revised copy of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, concluding a four year struggle between the House, Senate and his 
administration. The Senate approved the bill on 3 April by an 85-11 margin.169 The plant closing
measure was eventually passed by both the Congress and House, and Reagan allowed it to 
become law. Moreover, supporters of the bill claimed it would open markets, not close them
trade partners would be forced to comply or face retaliation. The bill also permitted US 
im also receive relief if they were “willing to make ‘positive adjustment’ ports. Industries could 
                                                 
166 Auerbach, “President Cautions,” D11.  
167 Ronald Reagan, “Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988,” 24 May 1988, Public Papers of Ronald Reagan [Accessed April 2009], 
Available online at: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/052488c.htm 
168 Reagan, “Message to the House.”  
169 “Major Trade Bill Sent to President by Senate,” New York Times, 4 August 1988, A1.  
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to foreign competition.”170 Moreover, the bill reduced US duties on products that the US did
produce and dictated that the president speed up unfair-trade actions in cases involving the 




rize the bill and the easing 






dities, which ultimately represented a Canadian competitive 
                                                
171 The conclusion of the Omnibus Bill represented th
continuous push and pull from a protectionist leaning Congress to an administration that tried to
adhere to its principles of free trade amidst a rising US trade deficit and increased foreign 
competition.172 Direct provisions relating to Canada did not characte
of the application of countervail, anti-dump and safeguard law was not passed through the bil
 The passage of the CUSFTA was the other crucial US trade policy concern of 1988. 
While Mulroney promoted the agreement during the 1988 Canadian election, the US Congress 
had to be convinced that it represented a fair bill for US companies and was in the nation’s be
economic interest. In the first round of Congressional hearings in the Bentsen-chaired Senate
Finance Committee, Sens. Danforth, Mitchell, Rockefeller, Baucus, and others opposed 
agreement, questioning the premise that the free trade agreement actually liberalized trade 
between the two countries. There was not, as many Canadians alleged, complete and imm
US support for the agreement.173 A fundamental concern of the opposing senators was the issu
of subsidization. Sen. Danforth argued that the bill did not completely eliminate Canadian 
subsidies, specifically for commo
 
t 
to Reagan,” Wall Street Journal, 4 August 1988, 3.  
vertly protectionist legislation, he vetoed a Senate passed textile bill that 
and curb imports of textile and apparel into the US. The argument from 
harm than good, inciting trade partners to put up barriers and result in even 
port Curbs,” Washington Post, 10 September 1988, A1, A9; 
le Imports,” Wall Street Journal, 29 September 1988, 62.   
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement—1988,” Hearing Before the Senate 
170 “Major Trade Bill,” D19.  
171 Monica Langley and Walter S. Mossberg, “Senate Approves Major Trade Measure by Vote of 85-11 and Sends i
172 Displaying Reagan’s skepticism of any o
sought to freeze shoe imports at 1987 levels 
Reagan was simple- it would create more 
fewer US jobs. Helen Dewar, “Senate Passes Textile Im
Ellen Hume, “Reagan Vetoes Bill to Limit Texti
173 Lloyd Bentsen (Chairman), “
Committee on Finance, 100th Congress, 17 March 1988 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989): see 
introductory statements of Senators, 1-35. *Herein referred to as “Hearing,” unless otherwise noted.  
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advantage in its production of goods, and therefore was not a liberalized agreement.174 Sen. 
Mitchell argued that, in one sense, the CUSFTA was liberalizing in that it removed tar
claimed that there were “many other provisions which preserve and validate trade-restrictive, 
trade-distorting, and trade-protectionist policies on both sides. It is inaccurate to call this a
trade agreement.”
iffs, but he 
 free 
h he 
“enforcement mechanism to really get ntry’s subsidies.”176 He believed 
y with 
3 
rms of the 
ress 
ees” in two 
175 In particular, Mitchell stressed his jurisdiction’s potato industry whic
believed was undercut by subsidies to Canadian potato farmers.  
 Sen. Baucus of Montana was skeptical of the CUSFTA because it did not contain an 
at lowering each cou
Canadian subsidies were much larger than US subsidies. Sen. Packwood was still unhapp
the ever-irritating lumber issues, and cited the Canadian Mortgage Housing Corporation that 
restricted the use of American plywood because of its weak stability in the colder Canadian 
winter.177 Sen. Durenberger voiced disapproval with the fact that the agreement did not 
specifically address CVD law in either country and cited an 85 percent Canadian tariff on US 
corn that was extremely restrictive to US corn exporters.178 The concerns with Canadian 
subsidies and CVD and AD law characterized the main US opposition to the agreement. One 
member of the finance committee opposed the agreement because of his reluctance in paying $
for an Ontario fishing license.179 
 Senators in favour of the CUSFTA believed that overall - and particularly in te
service industries - liberalized provisions would bring net benefits to both countries.180 Cong
eventually agreed to sign the CUSFTA Implementation Act after it secured “guarant
                                                 
174 Danforth, “United States,” Hearing, 4.  
175 Mitchell, “United States,” Hearing, 5.  
178 Durenberger, “United States,” Hearing, 38.  
179 Carney, Trade Secrets, 237. 
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176 Baucus, “United States,” Hearing, 7.  
177 Packwood, Baucus, “United States,” Hearing, 20.  
180 Lloyd Bentsen (Chairman), “United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement—1988,” Hearings Before the Senate
Comm th
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important concessions to the agreement: “that the United States government would monitor 
Canadian subsidy programs and report on them to Congress every year,” and that the 
government would use the ITC to oppose Canadian industries they believed used subsidies to 
compete unfairly.181 It is no surprise that the Senators only approved the bill under these 
circumstances.  They reflected the strong and long-developed views of Congress that US 
corporations suffered due to the “unfair” trade practices of foreign competitors. Ironically, 
liberalizing CUSFTA was accepted only under terms that satisfied protectionists in Congres
*            *            * 
the 
s.    
ative 
 
otectionist forces did not discriminate, though 
 US government and media sources reveal the strength of political and legisl
protectionism within the House and Senate throughout the 1980s. Protectionism resurfaced as a 
defensible position and solution to many in Washington. Increased competition from the US’s 
major trading partners, the 1981-1982 world recession, declining productivity in key American 
industries, an overvalued US dollar, and spiking US trade deficits all contributed to a dismal and 
uncertain global trading environment. This provoked closer US scrutiny of the trading practices
of its partners - particularly Canada, Japan and the EEC - and ensuing pleas for protection from 
both industry and Congressional representatives. The US also sought restrictions on products 
from Taiwan, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea. Pr
the number of irritants was largely relative to the volume of trade with competitors.   
 The proliferation of bills seeking protection, retaliation, and imposition of tariff and 
NTBs, and the general increase in CVD and AD petitions resulting in ITC and ITA 
investigations, suggest that protectionism grew more attractive as a political and legal policy 
alternative in the early 1980s. At the presidential level, the Reagan Era can be regarded as a time 
                                                 
181 Clyde Farnsworth, “How Congress Came to Love the Canada Free-Trade Bill,” New York Times, 5 June 1988, 
E4.  
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of both resistance and promotion of trade liberalization. The 1984 Trade and Tariff Act prov
the legal basis for fast-track bilateral negotiations with the US’s trading partners, yielding the
1985 US-Israel FTA and the historic CUSFTA. Washington’s push for liberalized global 
and its aggressive approach to the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds resulted primarily from i





undamentally influenced by Washington’s 
ndam
ce to satisfy 
 to 
us 
he US dollar in an attempt to reduce 
its trade deficits and the protectionism it caused.   
 From a Canadian perspective, the sources reinforced a distinction between actual realized 
protectionist measures, and their mere threat. Derek Burney reminisced in his memoirs that the 
Reagan administration mostly adhered to its own ideological position on free trade in practice.182 
This assertion suggests that in hindsight, the threat was not as imminent as many proponents 
argued. The Reagan administration acted in favour of very few protectionist bills brought forth in 
Congress. The imagery of “Fortress America” that existed in many Canadian minds was 
                                                
fu ental goal: to encourage free trade through the promotion of the reduction of tariff 
barriers. The threat of retaliation through select “protectionist” measures was domestically 
viewed as a potential means of opening “closed” markets.  
 Although the House foisted protectionist bills and pressures on the Reagan 
administration, many bills were vetoed or watered down from their original appearan
the administration. Many of the blatantly protectionist bills that Reagan did sign were aimed at 
countries other than Canada. By 1987 and 1988 “protectionism” became a dirty word in 
Congress and was perceived as an impediment to new trade legislation. It took much revision
pass the first Omnibus Trade Bill of 1984, and three years of revisions of the second Omnib
Trade Bill to be officially signed into law, despite strong Congressional support. The USTR and 
Reagan administration went so far as to artificially devalue t
 
182 Burney, Getting It Done, 114.  
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borderline hype ectionist 
to cause 
p. 
vent the implementation of the comprehensive 
greem
rbole. Paradoxically, open US markets to imports exacerbated prot
pressures. Nonetheless, the increased application of US trade remedy law and investigations 
clearly demonstrated protectionist strength and a considerable threat to Canada. Pending 
legislation was often watered down, but countervail, anti-dump and safeguard law was 
entrenched into US trade law and actively practiced.  
  Reagan vetoed many bills that he believed would be stifling to international trade and 
ultimately bad for US industry. Nonetheless, protectionist pressure was strong enough 
the Reagan administration to stray away from its principle of liberalized trade, resulting in 
unforgiving barriers on Canadian, Japanese and other nations’ exports that it deemed to benefit 
from unfair subsidies. Canadians in the 1980s were not inventing the strength of US 
protectionism. It thrived and created a sense of uncertainty in the Canada-US trade relationshi
Thankfully for Canada, the Reagan administration’s general resistance to protectionism dulled 
the worst potential outcomes and secured the way for the eventual signing of the CUSFTA. 
Protectionism was not strong enough to pre
a ent, but was supported by members of the House who insisted for the increased scrutiny 














Chapter 3: The Agreement – A Provisional Analysis 
 
 After Simon Reisman grudgingly halted negotiations on 23 September 1987, the dram
between the two countries reached its climax. The Americans insisted that Canada accept
that solely reduced tariffs. Derek Burney’s response was frank: “the deal we wanted, we d
see; the deal we see, we do not want.”1 The simple reduction of tariffs would not only benefit t
US more than Canada (because Canada had higher tariffs on US products than vice versa), bu
also fell short of Canada’s fundamental goal – an agreement with a dispute settlement 
mechanism that provid
[trade] practice.”2 A preferable deal for Canada would also include definitive definitions of what 
justified countervailable measures as a result of subsidization, a primary cause of trade 
and protectionist retaliation.3 Although the US was willing to enhance Canada’s access to
market through the gradual reduction of tariffs, a dispute settlement mechanism that addressed 
the application of trade remedies was a “sine qua non for Canada.”4 Canada wanted reduced 
vulnerability to American protectionism.5  
 At approximately 9:00 pm on 3 October 1987, just hours before the deadline to fast-track
an agreement not subject to amendments in the US Congress, Secretary Baker stormed into the
Canadian caucus room with an important piece of paper: “All right, you can have your godd
                                                 
1 Quoted in Burney, Getting It Done, 113.   
Canada’s Two Track Approach: Address to University of Toronto, Faculty of Management, 29 January 1988,” LAC 
2 DEA, “Canada-United States Trade Negotiations,” 4. Author’s parenthesis; Simon Reisman, “Trade Negotiations – 
MG31 E 112 Vol 4 File 23: 13-16.  
3 DEA, “Canada-United States Trade Negotiations,” 3.  
4 Burney, Getting It Done, 119. 
5 The following definitions are important for this chapter: Countervailing Duties- “Additional duties imposed by an 
importing country to offset government subsidies in an exporting country, when subsidized imports cause material 
g country.” Anti-Dumping Duties- “Additional duties imposed by an 
es where imports are priced at less than the ‘normal’ price charged in the exporter’s 
et and are causing material injury to a domestic industry in the importing country.” Safeguards- “The 
n the form of additional duties or import quotas applied to fairly 
s 
d from Steger, A Concise Guide, pgs. 108, 104, and 
injury to a domestic industry in the importin
importing country in circumstanc
domestic mark
term ‘safeguards’ refers to emergency actions i
traded imports which cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers. The imposition of such measures i
permitted under Article XIX of the GATT.” Definitions quote
124, respectively.   
dispute settlement mechanism,” he exclaimed. “Now we can send the report to Congress.”6 Th
original suggestion by Sam Gibbons, chair of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on 
Trade, that existing trade remedy laws be subject to a binational dispute panel, appeared 
adequate to the Canadians. Mulroney expressed in his memoirs that it “had the beauty of 




 both governments 
 against 
made 
of cases, and offers retaliation or termination of 
clear that U.S. politicians are only too happy to protect their constituents’ perceived interests.”11 
n “from unilateral interpretation of U.S. laws and 
7 Previous negotiating attempts at creating shared definitions of “safe harbours” 
subsidies had failed.8 With an agreement reached in principle, lawyers for
drafted its legal text.  
 After both countries formally signed the CUSFTA, Canadians debated its efficacy
American protectionism. Critics argued that the dispute settlement mechanism did not 
sufficiently shield Canada from US protectionism because it did not define the terms for 
acceptable and unacceptable subsidies.9 Others attacked the agreement on the basis that it 
“probable the prolonged and expensive review 
the treaty as the only recourse for violations.”10 Dalhousie economist, Michael Bradfield, 
asserted that the agreement did “not exempt us from the application of U.S. legislation and it is 
On the contrary, members of the Canadian manufacturing industry believed the agreement 
represented a major achievement even if Canada did not secure full exemption from US trade 
remedy law. Canadian firms now had protectio
                                                 
6 Quoted in Burney, Getting It Done, 119. 
7 Mulroney, Memoirs, 568-569.  
8 Ibid, 569.  
9 Miller, “The Mulroney-Reagan Accord,” 4.  
10 Kieran Furlong and Douglas Moggach, The Political Economy of Free Trade: Sectors, Cycle, and the State 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1988): 4.  
11 Bradfield, “The Free Trade Claims,” 7.  
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from blatant political manipulation.”12 The BCNI applauded the agreement and supported the 
dispute settlement mechanism on the premise that it guarded against US unilateralism throug
the binational panel, which “guarantee[d] fair interpretation and impartial application of our 
respective anti-dumping and countervailing duties” and limited the “use of quotas and import 
surcharges” aimed at either country.
h 
ing 
iently analyzed the text of the CUSFTA, 
particularly in terms of its guards again The legal text is of primary 
porta  trade. 
ade 
                                                
13 The BCNI also appreciated that no new laws impact
bilateral trade could be passed without Canadian review, and saw a bilateral commission 
overseeing the agreement’s implementation as a positive development.14  
 Existing historiography has not suffic
st US protectionism. 
im nce for the historian as its provisions ultimately guided and forever shifted bilateral
This chapter examines whether the legal agreement provided Canada with secured, enhanced and 
legally enshrined access to the US market – the fundamental goal of Canada’s passionate 
negotiating team in their quest for an FTA.15   
 Canada partly achieved its goals in the agreement. It attained enhanced tariff-free tr
by 1998. Modest gains were also made in Canada’s access to the US government procurement 
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erenced some of the above works throughout the chapter to provide an “authoritative” legal position 
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13 s P. d’Aquino, “Statement on Dispute Settlement and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 2
14 d’Aquino, “Statement on Dispute Settlement,” 1-2.  
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Gold and David Leyton-Brown, Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, A Proje
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market, and the US’s commitment to comprehensively apply principles of national treatment to 
the sectors covered by the agreement. Nonetheless, Canada did not attain legally-enshrined 
access to the US market. The agreement failed to develop harmonized definitions of acceptable 
and unacceptable subsidies. The dispute settlement mechanisms outlined in Chapters 18 and 19
represented an important and beneficial shift from unilateral interpretations of US laws to 
binational panels and the Canada-United States Trade Commission (CUTC). However, any 
Canadian gains from the reduction of conventional tariffs ultimately remained vulnerable to
application of American trade remedy law.   
*            *            * 
 Chapter 18 of the CUSFTA outlined new inst
 
 the 





[and] to resolve disputes that may arise over its interpretation and application.”17 The 
d that the 
GATT-like Canada-US Commission. Except for sections of the agreement on Financial Servic
(Chapter 17) and Binational Dispute Settlement in countervail and anti-dump cases (Ch
Chapter 18 defined the terms for safeguard and escape clause procedures and all other disputes
Canada’s Department of External Affairs noted that the basic objective of the institutional 
provisions was to “promote fairness, predictability and security by giving each Partner an equal 
voice in resolving problems through ready access to panels to resolve disputes and authoritative 
interpretations of the agreement.”16 
 Article 1802 instituted the CUTC to “supervise the implementation of this Agreem
Commission was to be comprised of both Canadians and Americans. 1802.2 note
                                                 
16 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,”[Accessed April 2009], Available online at: 
a/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/cusfta-e.pdf, 258.  
de Agreement,” 261. Author’s parenthesis.  
http://www.international.gc.c
This is an official copy of the CUSFTA text, directly from the Government of Canada’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade. This document contains DEA analysis prior to each chapter. *The abbreviated 
citation of the agreement’s legal text is cited throughout this chapter as simply “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement.”  
17 “The Canada-U.S. Free Tra
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CUTC t all 
of the “  
reduce tries’ exporters by requiring a written notice of any planned 
 a 




                                                
should meet at least annually to analyze how the agreement was functioning, and tha
decisions of the Commission shall be taken by consensus.”18 Article 1803 sought to
the vulnerability of both coun
trade action or actual trade measure against the other country as “far in advance as possible of 
the implementation of the measure.”19 All parties were to answer any questions as quickly as 
possible. Articles 1804 and 1805 legislated consultations between both parties to try to resolve
dispute within 30 days of a con
disputing parties themselves, the CUTC was to meet within 10 days to attempt to quickly resolv
the dispute.20 In doing so, the CUTC could contact “technical advisors” for additional expert
in a matter, or a mediator tolerable to both parties.21 
 The Commission had a 30 day timeframe to resolve a trade dispute, and if no solution 
was reached, the Commission was to either refer to guidelines under Chapter 11 of the 
agreement that addressed Emergency Actions in accordance with Article 1806, or establish a 
binational dispute panel pursuant to Articles 1806 and 1807. The Emergency Safeguards Action 
essentially allowed for the use of temporary restrictions like quotas or surcharges if it could be 
determined that “surges” in imports caused “serious injury” to a domestic producer during the 
“transition period” (which remained in effect until the end of 1998).22 Chapter 18 introduced the
basic Emergency Action provisions in accordance with Article 1101 of the agreement:   
 
20  
needed given each party’s schedules.  
21 Ibid, 263. Article 1805.2.  
22 A “surge” is defined by the agreement as “a significant increase in imports over the trend for a reasonable recent 
base period for which data are available.” Ibid, 171; Department of External Affairs (Canada), Canada-U.S. Free 
 the Elements of the Agreement as Reflected in the 
the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America (Ottawa: Department of 
irs, 1987): 11.  
18 Ibid, 262. By “consensus,” one can assume that all members must agree with each decision.   
19 Ibid. 
 Ibid. It should be noted that “Unless otherwise agreed, the Commission shall convene within 10 days and shall
endeavour to solve the dispute promptly.” Thus, it would be possible to leave the matter longer than 10 days if 
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Either country may respond to serious injury to domestic producers resulting from 
reductions for a limited period of time or a return to the most-favoured-nation 
multilateral negotiations).
the reduction of tariff barriers under the Agreement with a suspension of the duty 









There were limitations, however. Emergency measures could be in place for no longer than three
years, unless otherwise consented to by the other party, and could only be taken once durin
transition period. All emergency actions were also subject to compensation on the part of the 
party seeking the measures.24  
 The agreement also exempted both countries from global emergency actions instituted 
under Article XIX of the GATT, except in cases where “the other’s producers are important 
contributors to the injury caused by a surge in imports from all countries.”25 The agreement 
regarded import amounts from five to ten percent or less as not constituting a “substantial” surge 
in imports. Any amount over ten percent would be evaluated against its causal extent of the tot
injury to a sector. Article 1102 on global actions dealing with safeguards and escape clause laws 
offered Canada important protection from US trade barriers not specifically directed at Canada.
For example, if the US instituted a global emergency action against Japan on the basis of sectora
injury, and Canadians exported the same product to the US contributing to the injury of the same 
sector as Japan, Canada would not be subject to an emergency action from the US if its exports 
minutely influenced the net injury of the sector in trouble. However, if Canadian exports were 
deemed an important cause of injury, barriers would be justified. Debra Steger, then partner at
Fraser & Beatty (Ottawa), argued that “the new FTA standards will reduce significantly the 
number of cases involving imports from several countries where Canadian exports have been 
                                                 
23 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” See Chapter 11.  
24 Ibid, 170.  
25 Ibid, 167.  
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‘sideswiped,’ even though they represented an insignificant percentage of total imports.
this capacity, Canada gained increased security of access to the US market because it was 
excluded from safeguards, import quotas, or additional duties against third party countries’




nd panel.   
uld 





h 5 of 1807 gave the panel a three month window to produce its initial report 
27 As 
opposed to previous cases like shakes and shingles where the US government imposed a 
safeguard measure on Canada which could not be challenged, under the CUSFTA, Canada could
dispute the decision under the binational Commission a
 If a dispute was not dealt with via Chapter 11 safeguard procedures, the disputants co
pursue “binding arbitration.” This was the more likely route, given that the Commission
formally review any decisions reached through the Chapter 11 procedures. Articles 1806 and
1807 essentially formed a binational arbitration panel. Firstly, the panelists were to be experts i
their respective fields and chosen on the basis of objectivity. They were not permitted to ta
instructions or counsel from either party of the dispute.28 Each 5 person panel had to have at 
least 2 Canadian citizens and 2 American citizens, appointed by each party. The fifth panel 
member was to be jointly chosen by the CUTC in accordance with 1807.3. If the Commissio
could not agree on the fifth panelist member within 15 days, the 4 appointed panelists had to 
decide on one within 30 days or he/she would be chosen from the list of eligible panelists created 
pursuant to 1807.1.29 The panel would then analyze the arguments, both written and oral, of the 
disputants. Paragrap
on the dispute. Subsequently, both parties were invited to present any objections back to the 
                                                 
26 Debra P. Steger, “Dispute Settlement,” In Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1988): 184.  
29 According to the text, “if a Party fails to appoint its panelists within 15 days, such panelists shall be selected by lot 
from among its citizens described in paragraph 1.” Ibid, 264. Paragraph 1 outlines that the CUTC should maintain a 
l panelists able to serve who “have expertise in the particular matter under consideration. Panelists 
be affiliated with or take instructions from either Party.”   
27 “Safeguard Measures” refer to numerous types of quantitative restrictions, import quotas, or duties.  




dispute panel. If necessary, the panel could reconsider its decision and then “make any further 
examination that it deems appropriate and issue a final report” within 30 days of the initial 
report.30 The CUTC should ultimately agree with the panel’s resolution. According to the 
agreement, “whenever possible, the resolution shall be non-implementation or removal o
measure not conforming with this Agreement or causing nullification or impairment in the sense




S ITC, ITA and White House administration. The creation of the CUTC 
provide ng 
the agr ts of 
the agr
panelis ns, but 
they were to be both Canadian and American. As such, any potential interpretations of trade laws 
and subsequent remedies or compensatory programs would no longer solely depend on the ruling 
of a US institution. 
 A major underlying assumption of the Chapter 18 creation of the CUTC and binational 
dispute panel was that by having Americans and Canadians both present on the Commission and 
panel process, a more “impartial” resolution might be passed. Although this represented a 
                                                
31 Essentially, the resolution should 
be in accordance with the basic agreement and CUTC. 
 Chapter 18 provisions represented a significant shift in solving trade disputes: f
unilateral interpretations and deliberations of trade irritants to bilateral procedures and 
participation. While not perfect, it offered security against potentially protectionist US trade 
sanctions, resolutions or decisions against Canada purely based on US interpretations of trade 
laws within the U
d Canada with the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process overseei
eement and to ensure that the panelists’ conclusions were consistent with the elemen
eement. The panel procedures were consistent with the bilateral goal. Not only were 
ts chosen on the basis of expertise, perceived objectivity and non-partisan affiliatio
 
30 Ibid, 265.  
31 Ibid.  
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significant step in the right direction for Canada, it did not necessarily ensure objective tr




e Commission has not reached agreement on a mutually satisfactory 
resolution under paragraph 8 within 30 days of receiving the final report of the 
or benefits (anticipated under this Agreement) are or would be impaired by the 
suspend the application to the other Party of benefits of equivalent effect until 
  
The ability of any party to seek “benefits of equivalent effect” until an agreement was reached 
indicated that retaliation was justifiable. It remained ambiguous how “benefits of equivalent 
effect” would be measured or what type of retaliatory measures would be acceptable in such 
cases. These were two obvious points of contention. Under 1807.9, Canada was still legally 
 
with a country’s position, or give special credence to a particular point of view in accordance 
with basic standards of objectivity, the presence of a specified number of Americans or 
Canadians should theoretically be irrelevant in coming to “fairer” decisions. (“Fair,” of course, 
could not necessarily imply rulings in Canada’s favour, but a balanced consideration of the facts
of the case). The possibility remained that US interpretations of Canadian trade practices could 
be just as irritating, politically motivated or in accordance with US institutional clout. 
Perceptions of each country’s trade laws were still subject to the interests of both parties.  
 Moreover, Article 1807.9 of the panel procedures indicated that if the CUTC could not 
agree on a solution to a dispute, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the “wronged” party 
remained open: 
If th
panel…and a Party considers that its fundamental rights (under this Agreement) 
implementation or maintenance of the measure at issue, the Party shall be free to 
such time as the Parties have reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute.32 
susceptible to US protectionist retaliation in cases where the Commission could not agree on the
                                                 
32 Ibid.  
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resolution of a dispute. Retaliatory measures were limited to the duration of the dispute, 
however, so they could not result in permanent measures under the CUSFTA.33 
 A positive aspect of the Chapter 18 dispute process was its focus on timeframes. Under 
various provisions, both parties could look forward to receiving a decision in a timely manner,
and, in accordance with the 1807 panel procedures, a decision could be expected from the C
in about eight months of the initial complaint, barring any unavoidable circumstances or d







       *            * 
34 As Gotlieb emphasized throughout the f
trade debate, the expensive and lengthy legal battles almost existed as another non-tariff barrier 
as Canadian companies and their lead institutions would have to pay millions in legal costs to 
fight numerous trade complaints from the US, including those of safeguard measures covered b
Chapter 18.35 Thus, the CUSFTA limited the chances of drawn-out and costly multi-year trade 
disputes over a single irritant, and invoked a more predictable timeframe for industries to expect
a decision. 
 Overall, the Chapter 18 institutional provisions represented an important shift from 
unilateralism to bilateralism. Although this Chapter of the FTA was not “bullet-proof” and 
Canada was not completely immune to short-term US retaliation under article 1807, it gave 
Canada increased protection from unilateral US protectionism in a timely and increasingly fair 
manner through the CUTC and binational dispute panels.  
*     
                                                 
33 Ibid; Stephen Clarkson, “The Canada-United States Trade Commission: The Political Implications of CUSTER 
for Canada,” In Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Toronto: Carswell, 1988): 165.  
34 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 263-265. Articles 1805 to 1807 highlight the acceptable timeframes of 
ote in his diary that, in particular, the lumber countervail petition 
t the 
us US trade bodies.  
each part of the dispute process.  
35 Gotlieb, Washington Diaries, 386. Gotlieb wr
represented a “new form of protectionism: procedural harassment.” This was not just limited to lumber, bu
continuous petitions being put forward through vario
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 Chapter 19, dealing specifically with disputes over anti-dump and countervail cases, w
one of the most anticipated and important aspects of the CUSFTA. CVDs and ADs were the 
more severe forms of economic barriers to bilateral trade in comparison to conventional tariffs. 
Between 1980 and mid-1987, the US launched 11 countervail and 20 anti-dumping case









immediate basis from a legal perspective.   
cles 1906 and 1907 of Chapter 19 set up the framework for the creation of a Canada-
36 The fundamental Canadian goal, of course, was to gain clearer 
definitions of “countervailable financial assistance programs (i.e., subsidies) to industry, 
agriculture, and fisheries, thus reducing the threat of countervailing duties” and to reduce its 
exposure to US trade remedy laws through a dispute settlement mechanism designed to “increa
predictability and security for Canadian exporters to the United States.”37 The DEA explained i
its preceding Chapter 19 comments that, “actions taken under U.S. trade remedy laws against 
Canadian exports have had a detrimental impact on investment and employment in Canada, and 
have become a major irritant in Canada-U.S. relations.”38 Canadians would have been satisfi
with a binding dispute settlement mechanism in tandem with new countervailable specifications.  
 The Chapter 19 provisions represented an important step for the overall, long-term
Canada-US trading relationship. It significantly improved the potential for the fair binational 
resolve of anti-dumping and countervail disputes. Although the commitment of both countries 
develop a mutually agreeable trade law system was positive, the fundamental Canadian aim of 
reducing exposure and vulnerability to US protectionist trade remedies was not achieved o
 Arti
US “substitute system of rules in both countries for antidumping and countervailing duties as 
                                                 
36 Lester and Morehen, “Trade Barriers,” 28. For reference, Canada launched only 1 countervail case against the US 
ment,” 267. 
in the same period and 41 anti-dumping cases.  
37 DEA, “Canada-United States Trade Negotiations,” 3; “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 267.  
38 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree
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applied to their bilateral trade.”39 The negotiations on new subsidies rules applicable to both
countries were subject to a maximum period of seven years. After that time, the “failure to agree 










                                                
40 The CUSFTA could be cancelled, keeping open the possibility for Canadian 
companies to face increased protectionism if the negotiations were unsuccessful. The “Working 
Group” established by Article 1907 was created to “develop more effective rules and disciplines
concerning the use of government subsidies;… seek to develop a substitute system of rules for
dealing with unfair pricing and government subsidization,” and to address any issue that arose 
with the implementation of Chapter 19.41 As it turned out, Canadian exporters did not achie
greater predictability because the agreement did not enshrine clear definitions of subsidiz
rules. Existing legal standards of the GATT would suffice until then.42 The additional possibility 
that talks on subsidies would not succeed left open the threat of a shaky Canada-US trading 
relationship and did not legally encourage short-term investment.43 
 While the CUSFTA failed to include explicit rules on subsidies, it is important to 
remember that issues of legal sovereignty over domestic trade laws were of primary importance
to both countries during talks. Given the strong climate of protectionism in the US House and 
Senate established in Chapter 2, there existed a bi-partisan impetus amongst the free traders
protectionists encouraging the prosecution of “unfair” trade practices amongst its tra
 
41
Free Trade Agreement (Toronto: Carswell, 1988): 188-190. Quinn argued that this was unfortunate, as GATT legal 
standards on CVD and AD law remained vague, and that GATT definitions had “never received any authoritative 
interpretation by GATT dispute resolution panels.” Also, Quinn believed that GATT failed to enforce its standards 
tive,” 189. The economic argument of the Canadian government was that legal 
s would make conditions more favourable for investment. With the absence of those conditions, the legal 
39 Ibid, 279.  
40 Ibid. 
 Ibid.  
42 John J. Quinn, “A Critical Perspective on Dispute Settlement,” In Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. 
regardless.  
43 Quinn, “A Critical Perspec
safeguard
basis for this claim was not present.    
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dify subsidies or other supports to 
 from 
ation practices and 
armon
 
apply domestic countervail and anti-dumping laws to the trade practices of exporters pursuant to 
athered up to 1 January 
                                     
44 From the Canadian perspective, subsidization programs suppor
by various levels of government had to be dealt with during negotiations. This was difficult, a
“implications for Canada would have been more severe than those for the United States,” 
Mulroney explained. “Because so much of what Canada produces has a trade dimension, 
the U.S. with its massive internal market, any measure to mo
industry would have been much more restrictive for Canada.”45 The difficulty in coming to a 
consensus on acceptable subsidies stemmed from these concerns. Time restraints resulting
the “fast-track” US negotiating authority did not help matters, as it was clear that repeated 
attempts to define subsidization rules failed during negotiations and were too onerous to 
complete prior to the 4 October 1987 deadline.46 The difficulty in establishing such a system was 
obvious given the seven-year window allotted by the CUSFTA to create a new system. Both 
countries were aware of the complexity and constructed the CUSFTA accordingly.  
 As the Working Group developed a new system outlining subsidiz
h ization of Canadian and American countervail and anti-dumping laws, Article 1904 set 
up provisions for the immediate creation of a dispute settlement mechanism that applied both 
countries’ AD/CV laws to any future disputes. It established a bilateral panel to adjudicate 
disputes in the interim, thus replacing the “judicial review of final antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations.”47 At the same time, each country retained its full ability to
Article 1902. Existing countervail and anti-dumping laws could be grandf
            
t,” 273.  
44 Steger, “Dispute Settlement,” 186.  
45 Mulroney, Memoirs, 569. 
46 Ibid.  
47 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreemen
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1989.48 Each country also retained its rights to “change or modify its antidumping law or 
countervailing duty law.”49 In accordance with 1902.2.a, Canada would have to be explicitly 
mentioned if the US decided to amend any new anti-dumping or countervail laws that could 
potentially impact Canada.50 1902.2.d specified that any changes to domestic laws must be 
consistent with the GATT, specifically Article VI dealing with anti-dumping codes, and 
subsidies codes outlined in Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII.51  
 Any legal revisions were to be consistent with the “object and purpose of this Agreemen
and this Chapter, which is to establish fair and predictable conditions for the progressive 










tr actices.”52 The agreement placed no requirement for the assessment of US anti-dumping 
or countervail laws already in place.53 By allowing grandfathered changes up to 1 January 1989
Canada remained vulnerable in the short-term. The CUSFTA attempted to smooth the transiti
process, however, by allowing each country to adjust its respective trade practices over time
while attempting to uphold the major liberalizing goal of the agreement.  
 These legal provisions evidently failed to create a more “predictable” trade climate under 
agreed upon terms of acceptable and unacceptable subsidies. They also upheld each coun
right to pursue compensatory measures from each other’s exporters through CVDs and ADs.
Nonetheless, Canada secured an improved context for applying US trade remedy laws to 
disputes– it did not take a “step back” in terms of its legal exposure to US protectionism. 
                                                 
 Richard and Dearden, “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 65.  48
50 Ibid; Steger, “Dispute Settlement,” 183.  
51 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 272.  
52 Ibid. 
e,” 190. Quinn argued that some existing US laws “may not 
GATT standards,” as certain US requirements for implementing and finding material injury were to be 
as the GATT material injury test noted that proof of “material injury” must 
ed. This is a crucial distinction.  
49 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 271.  
53 Ibid, (Article 1902); Quinn, “A Critical Perspectiv
conform with 
“not immaterial or insubstantial,” where
be provid
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procedural improvement was in the binational panel that would make the interpretation of US 
laws subject to Canadian experts in dealing with dumped or subsidized imports, as opposed to 
e 




laws were being formed; the only change was essentially who interpreted relevant laws and case 
                                                
unilateral decisions made by a federal US court, ITC or ITA, susceptible to political pressure. 
With the presence of binational counsel, countervail and anti-dump cases would be subject to a 
review panel of “whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping or 
countervailing duty law of the importing Party.”54 The panel was directed to analyze, in its 
assessment of each country’s countervail and anti-dump laws, the statutes and their legislativ
history, “regulations, administrative practice, and judicial precedents to the extent that a court of 
the importing Party would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination.”55  
 Canadian
any weight in terms of US law (1904.3), instead of a US federal court. The replacement of the 
binational panel for a single US judge did not alter the fact that the panel would still have to 
weigh US laws against the same standards that the U.S. Court of International Trade would 
utilize. If it could be proven that “substantial evidence” existed to support the position of the U
ITC or ITA that a decision was consistent with US laws, the panel would have to legally uphold 
the decision. John Quinn, partner at Cassels, Brock and Graydon (Toronto), argued that 
upholding an ITC or ITA decision based on its plausibility to US law and determinations of
substantial evidence was “not a very demanding standard to satisfy.”56 The substitution of the 
binational panel could not change how “substantial evidence” tests were to be applied in 
countervail and anti-dump cases.57 US laws and standards of evidence still applied while the new
 
54 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 273.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Quinn, “A Critical Perspective,” 192. 
57 Ibid.  
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evidence. The Canadian perspective on the application of those laws represented a procedural 
gain, but was not necessarily an improvement in how those laws were to be applied.   
 The underlying assumption of the argument that there would be increased objectivity in
the rulings of a binational panel against a US federal court judge is that a US judge could
objective or removed from direct political pressures. This is a serious criticism of the US justic
system, and to assume the automatic lack of objectivity in the American system is dubious and 
unsupported. The Chapter 19 panel procedures, like those of Chapter 18, do not necessarily 
guarantee objectivity but at least start to quell the worry that US trade laws would be interpreted 
in an unfair way against Canada due to unilateral applications of law and interpretations of the
case evidence.   
 In accordance with Annex 1901.2 (Establishment of Binational Panels), panelists were to 
be chosen from a list of 50 potential members shown to be “of good character, high standing and
repute, and shall be strictly chosen on the basis of objectivity, reliability
 










                                                
g l familiarity with international trade law,” on an as-needed basis as disputes arose.58 In
their 1988 analyses, lawyers Debra Steger and John Quinn raised doubts about the effectivene
of the ad hoc nature of panels rather than one comprised of permanent positions. Quinn argu
that “the selection of panelists on a case-by-case basis is likely to make future panels more 
deferential to official (government-espoused) interpretations of AD/CV duty laws.”59 He
contended that selected panelists would not develop a larger set of overall goals of the FTA. 
Furthermore, to be selected on future panels the panelists would be inclined to decide in favour
 
anada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 285.  
.  
58 “The C
59 Quinn, “A Critical Perspective,” 191
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of their respective governments.60 Steger asserted that the ad hoc nature of the panels was not 
conducive to a more “integrated, authoritative, permanent, independent institution.”61  
 These were valid criticisms, but were not absolute. Having permanent panelists might 
lead to a stagnant or steered vision for the CUSFTA. Panelists might feel pressured into 






                              
and not necessarily because they represented the fairest interpretation of applicable laws. Cl
to this point, on a case-by-case basis, the issues and evidence could be markedly different. Either
US or Canadian laws would have to be analyzed depending on who launched the dispute, which 
could be potentially onerous on panel members and even confusing in attempting to properly 
distinguish between both sets of technical laws. On a fundamental level, putting the power of 
Chapter 19 into the hands of five people per term was a large and risky bet for future Canada-US 
trade. The completion of the CUSFTA required the work, analysis and cooperation of hundreds 
of Canadian and American politicians, legal experts, and bureaucrats.  
 Moreover, a system of permanent panel-members instead of ad hoc members would 
certainly not eradicate the potential for political pressure. Concessions would most like
sought between the panelists themselves on various issues, not to mention obvious general 
pressures from their government of citizenship to continue to pursue rulings in their favour. If 
anything, this would be magnified between the 2 or maximum 3 Canadians on the panel 
compared to dozens that could be chosen on an ad hoc basis. There is less of a chance of “deal-
making” between panelists on cases with different panel members than with panelists familia
with one another’s biases and interpretations of Canadian and US laws. Permanent panelis
be subject to making concessions to one another more than people serving on ad hoc panels. A 
                   
60 Ibid. 
61 Steger, “Dispute Settlement,” 186.  
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sense of arbitrary diplomatic concession making could easily characterize the dispute settlem
process in a permanent panel. Another important point is that the panels were to be 5 member
panels and therefore not based on equal representation. With an unequal weighting it would be 
ent 
 





ree trade with the United States. If Canadian exporters were still 
uld be 
Canada-US trading partnership. In the short-term, Canada remained fully susceptible to US 
, it is 
essary “consensus” o
possibility of dissenting members making concessions.   
 One benefit of the dispute settlement panel process to Canadian exporters were the 
precise timelines to resolve disputes. Prior to the CUSFTA, Canadian exporters not only had t
pay hefty litigation bills, but had to present their case to the US ITC, Department of Commerce
ITA, US Court of International Trade, and sometimes Congress. Industry also had to pay du
owed during litigation after a preliminary ruling against Canada.62 The new 10-month timeline 
for a panel dispute decision represented a significant improvement for Canadian exporters. P
cases reviewed by the US Court of International Trade took at least two years, with several cases 
lasting longer and thus entailing more expense for Canadian exporters.63 Furthermore, under the 
CUSFTA, the Canadian government would have to request a binational panel on behalf of an 
industry or corporation and would therefore assume a portion of the litigation costs.64  
 The issue of dispute settlement was also fundamental in appraising the overall benefits to 
Canadian exporters from tariff-f
subject to CVDs or ADs after tariffs were reduced, the gains from liberalization of trade co
erased. Nonetheless, the creation of the binational panel represented an important shift toward a 
protectionism via anti-dumping and countervail laws for a maximum of seven years until 
rectified. With the conclusion of the 1994 NAFTA (which legally superseded the CUSFTA)
                                                 
62 Ibid, 184.  
63 Quinn, “A Critical Perspective,” 194.  
64 Steger, “Dispute Settlement,” 184. 
 100
ironic to note that no explicit definitions on subsidies were established. During NAFTA 
negotiations, the attempt at developing trilateral definitions of CV and AD laws failed again
leaving disputes to a trilateral trade panel similar to the Chapter 19 provisions of the CUS







ent also secured Canada’s access to tariff-free sectors of the US economy 
at ex e access. 
tries 
percent or more prior to the CUSFTA prevented Canadian companies from achieving economies 
                           
 The CUSFTA satisfied Canada’s goal of attaining broad tariff reductions, creating an 
increasingly liberalized free trade area. The tariff reductions represented about a 20 percent 
increase in the overall tariff-free trade in goods and services over a 10 year period. It was the
largest liberalized trade agreement signed by two countries.66 Tariffs were the most prevalent 
bilateral form of protection and their removal essentially improved Canadian access to the 
crucial US market. The CUSFTA also met the Article XXIV GATT provision, paragraph 8(a)(
which stated that any negotiated FTA had to eliminate duties on “substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the union.”67 It was also the first comprehensive agreem
to liberalize trade on services and investment, and reduced agricultural tariffs not covered by
GATT.68 The agreem
th isted prior to the agreement by legally stating otherwise already enjoyed tariff-fre
The CUSFTA did not require Canada or the US to develop a common trade policy with coun
not included in the agreement.  
 The removal of tariffs represented a significant gain for Canada. High tariffs of 15 
                      
TT 1947),” [Accessed April 2009], Available online at: 
orldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gatt.pdf, 31; Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 1; “The Canada-U.S. Free 
65 Gary C. Hufbauer, and Jeffrey H. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment (Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, 1993): 102.  
66 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 7.  
67 “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA
http://www.w
Trade Agreement,” 9. Article 101 stated that: “The Government of Canada and the Government of the United States 
of America, consistent with Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, hereby establish a free-
trade area.”  
68 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 7; Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 18.  
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of scale, and their removal increased the potential for Canadian employment and improved 
competitiveness. High tariffs on petrochemicals, clothing, metal alloys, and zinc alloy had 
prevented these industries from establishing manufacturing facilities. The consumer was 
similarly disadvantaged by high tariffs, which inflated prices.69  
 Tariffs were to be eliminated in stages beginning on 1 January 1989 and ending 1 Janua
1998 pursuant to Article 401.
ry 





ds not subject to tariffs were to be Canadian or American in “origin.” For example, natural 
resourc a, in 
           
70 This nine year period was outlined as sufficient to remove tariff 
barriers and give sensitive industries time to adjust. In acc
tariffs under Category A were to be abolished immediately when the agreement came into f
Category B goods were to be eliminated through five annual reductions of 20 percent per annu
and Category C duties were to be removed 10 percent per year for 10 years.71 The Chapter 11 
Emergency Action provision was retained to invoke a previous tariff level wherever increased 
imports caused “substantial” material injury to any domestic industry.72 Additionally, if both
countries agreed, the removal of tariffs on certain products or services could be accelerat
pursuant to 401.5.73  
 The tariff reductions outlined in the agreement were subject to rules of origin, a 
fundamental aspect of any FTA.74 Fundamentally, the CUSFTA rules of origins meant that 
goo
es contained in Canadian lands would certainly be classified as originating in Canad
                                      
anada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 42.  
9-50.  
ment of External Affairs, “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Tariff Schedule of the United St
d April 2009], Available online
69 “The C
70 Ibid, 4
71 Depart ates,” 
[Accesse  at:  http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/FTA-Tariff-Schedule-of-US-en.pdf; “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 59.  
72 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 169.  
73 Ibid, 50.   
e set of measures used to differentiate between goods originating 
ry from those in another for the purpose of application of trade measures such as tariffs. Such rules are 
are members of a free-trade area to ensure that only goods originating in one or 
l tariff treatment.” Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 8-10, 124.   
74 Definition of Rules of Origin: “The terms for th
in one count
very important for countries which 
all of the member countries will receive preferentia
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addition to livestock and agriculture, or machinery produced with Canadian steel. Under the 
a ent, certain goods could classify as originating in Canada even if some of the materials 
used to produce them were from other countries, as long as the products changed enough in 
substance to satisfy the CUSFTA rules of origin. Any goods that did not satisfy the rules of 
origin requirements were still subject to tariff barriers – the agreement was intended to benefit 









used or consumed in the production of the goods plus the direct cost of 
less than 50 percent of the value of the goods when exported to the territory of the 
 Article 301 stated that “goods originate in the territory of a Party if they are wholly 
obtained or produced in the territory of either Party or both Parties.”75 This general provisi
distinguished between products that were either partly produced or in substance acquired fro
another country. Goods were not considered to originate in either country that had undergone 
simple packaging, had been diluted with water or anything that did “not materially alter the 
characteristics of the good,” or undergo any production that was used to purposely gain 
preferential treatment pursuant to 301.3.76 The latter provision was designed to essentially li
blatant avoidances of rules of origin.77 Specific rules of origin were included in Annex 3
which also defined rules in the “assembly” of goods. Assembled goods “originated” in a country 
if: 
a) the value of materials originating in the territory of either Party or both Parties 
assembling the goods in the territory of either Party or both Parties constitute not 
other Party and b) the goods have not subsequent to assembly undergone 
processing of further assembly in a third country and they meet the requirements 
of Article 302.78 
 
                                                 
75 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 17.  
76 Ibid.   
77 Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 10.  
da-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 22.  78 “The Cana
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This classification allowed for a relatively open definition of a product “assembled” in Canada.79  
 Both countries also reaffirmed their commitments to Article III of the GATT in Chapter 
5, Articles 501 and 502. This ensured the commitment of both countries to regard imported 
rds.81 Both countries agreed to their obligations under the GATT to 
 
goods with treatment no less favourable than treatment given to domestic goods in terms of 
taxation, laws, regulations and requirements.80 This affirmed each country’s obligation to not 
impose restrictions less favourable to Canadian products exported to the US than American 
products.  
 Chapter 6 addressed so called “technical” non-tariff barriers to trade that could result in 
“highly protectionist trade measures” arising from health, safety, environment or national 
security product standa
respect federal government measures so neither country would “maintain or introduce standards-
related measures or procedures for product approval that would create unnecessary obstacles to 
trade.”82 An “unnecessary obstacle” was not deemed to be a standard or procedure designed to 
achieve a legitimate domestic objective, and the standard imposed was not to be introduced 
solely to exclude the exports of a country. Article 604 dictated that each country should 
harmonize their product standards to gain product approval from the other, including recognition
of product standards by private entities not governed by the federal government.83 However, 
Chapter 6 only applied to federally-governed product standards and not to provincial or state 
measures. In the case of some Midwest US “hog states,” their objections to the importation of 
                                                 
79 The 50 percent rule was not applicable to apparel products. Apparel made from Canadian or American fabrics, not 
including those knitted or crocheted, qualified for tariff reductions, in additional to apparel made from “offshore” 
fabrics up to 50 million yards in non-woolen apparel from Canada and 6 million yards of woolen apparel from 
Canada in comparison to 10.5 and 1.1 million yards respectively from the US. Richard and Dearden, “The Canada-
ement,” 17. Canada thus retained a small advantage in this respect by being allowed to export a 
  
.  
U.S. Free Trade Agre
greater amount of apparel product made from offshore fabrics tariff-free and consequently meet economies of scale.
80 “The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947),” 6-7.  
81 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 69
82 Ibid, 71.  
83 Ibid, 72.  
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Canadian hogs would not contradict the rules outlined in the CUSFTA because it was a state, n
federal, matter. Technical standards at the provincial-state level still left open the possibility
potentially significant barriers.  
 Nonetheless, both countries agreed to exchange texts of any new proposed federal or 
smaller-scale government standards in enough time so that the other count
ot 
 for 





                                                
th his would allow them to adjust their practices, reducing the chance of missing bilateral 
trading opportunities. Although federal stipulations were only covered in the CUSFTA, a cordial 
system was developed on a best-efforts basis to make each country aware of any standards that 
might impose a barrier in advance, providing them with the opportunity to comment and to 
adjust accordingly.84   
 Chapter 13 of the CUSFTA dealt with non-tariff barriers relating directly to government 
procurement programs, or “Buy-National” programs.85 Canada’s goal of enhancing its access to 
the American market included government procurement as one major in-road.86 The 
procurement codes outlined in the agreement did not apply to the provincial or state level 
programs as the US Buy America Act continued to allow many state governments and certain 
federal agencies to restrain Canadian exporters from participating in the attainment of contract
However, Canada made some modest gains in the US government market. First, the overall 
“threshold” of access to government procurement contracts was reduced from the GA
restrictions of US$171,000 to US$25,000 pursuant to Article 1304. Any government 
procurement contracts were still subject to the principle of national treatment. The Governmen
 
84 Ibid, 72-73, 299.  
ent agencies. As a non-tariff 
re 
ncise Guide,” 114.  
Trade Negotiations,” 3; Economic Council of Canada (ECOC), Venturing Forth: An 
ttawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988): 5.  
85 Definition of Government Procurement- “Purchases of goods by official governm
barrier to trade, it refers to discriminatory purchases from domestic suppliers, even when imported goods are mo
competitive.” Steger, “A Co
86 DEA, “Canada-United States 
Assessment of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (O
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Procurement Code negotiated through the GATT Tokyo Round essentially worked towards 




, including contracts dealing with vehicles, 
’s US 
ts 
                                                
awareness of contracts through pre-solicitation information without discrimination was achieved 
pursuant to Article 1301.87 This was not a formal achievement, but rather a procedural 
affirmation of both countries’ commitment to the GATT. The large reduction in the threshold 
was better than no reduction. 
 Though the reduced threshold translated into better access to the US market, Canad
gains were still limited. US government procurement in defence, transport, telecommunications,
construction, advertising, and research and development remained closed to Canada pursuant 
Annex 1304.3.88 US Department of Defence contracts, which included billions of dollars on 
research and development, were a particular concern.89 Some Department of Defence non-
military purchases were allowed under the agreement
engines, industrial components and information technology. One improvement for Canada
procurement access were the new “Bid Challenge Procedures” outlined in Annex 1305.3. These 
procedures allowed for the “impartial” review of complaints (by parties that had no material 
interest in the outcome) where Canadian companies or industries felt they were discriminated 
against in the bidding for US government procurement contracts pursuant to Annex 1305.3.90 
The instituted Bid Challenge Procedures allowed for the impartial committee to recommend 
changes in each country’s procurement procedures pursuant to 1305.3.g, and general 
procurement practices were to be monitored by each government through the exchange of 
information on domestic procurement statistics by various government agencies, departmen
 
87 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 179; Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 39.  
reement,” 184-191. See US items covered under agreement. Department of 
nturing Forth, 14. 
da-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 192-193.  
88 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Ag




and products.91 The enhancement of the GATT Government Procurement Code was a favourab
step for Canada.   
le 








                                    
 In select industries, specific trade liberalizing specifications were developed. C
the CUSFTA was devoted to agriculture, an important export industry for Canada that sold about 
$3 billion of product into the US per year.92 Article 701 disallowed export subsidies on products 
between Canada and the US. This was the first time that any two governments had agreed to ba
export subsidies in agriculture and was a step toward liberalization. Articles 401 and 702 
introduced phased-in tariff reduction of Category C (reductions over 10 years), and Article 704 
exempted Canada from restrictions based on US meat import laws, which was significant for 
securing Canadian export access to American beef and veal markets. According to the DEA, 
Canadian exports in the past “found their exports limited as the U.S. triggered its meat imp
restrictions or sought voluntary export restraints.”93  
 Article 707 also helped secure Canadian access to the US agricultural market as it 
exempted it from future quantitative import quotas on products that contained 10 percent or less
sugar. This overrode an existing GATT waiver that c
with price support programs. Additionally, an effort was made pursuant to Article 708 to reduce 
regulatory barriers from product standards that especially caused export headaches for Canadian
pork producers. Both countries sought to harmonize product standards in line with the so cal
“open border policy” which put forward the impetus to “establish equivalent accreditatio
procedures for inspection systems and inspectors.”94 Defined broadly, the open border policy 
meant working to eliminate “technical regulations and standards that...would constitute, an 
             
91 Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 40.  
92 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 75.  
93 Ibid, 76.  
94 Ibid, 86.  
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arbitrary, unjustifiable or disguised restriction on bilateral trade.”95 The agricultural provisions 
qualified Canada’s secured access to the large US market.  
 For the most part, the chapters on energy and auto sectors (Chapters 9 and 10 
respectively) secured existing tariff-free access to the US market. Canada’s energy exports to th
US accounted for more than $10 billion per annum, which included conventional oil and gas and 
other alternative sources of energy like uranium, and of course, electricity. Energy had been a 
contentious issue between Canada and the US, as Canada was subjec
e 
t to restrictions on uranium, 
 US 
 
same tax, duty or charge was applied in domestic cases pursuant to Article 903. However, both 
countries retained the right to introduce any export or import restrictions allowed under the 
s to reduce domestic shortages of a highly 
, 
 
and had been threatened with import fees on crude oil and electricity. Secured access to the
market was therefore a top priority for Canadian negotiators.96 A US aversion to the Trudeau 
government’s National Energy Program kept the US cautious of Canadian energy practices in 
general. One important Canadian gain was the US exemption of Canada in its restrictions 
imposed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which eliminated a long-standing threat against
Canadian uranium exports.97 Canadian uranium exports would therefore no longer have to be 
processed before being sold to the US.98 The US also exempted Canada from its prohibition of 
Alaskan oil up to 50,000 barrels per day annually.99 
 The CUSFTA precluded the imposition of any new export tax, duty or charge unless the 
GATT, which included temporary prohibition
demanded product, conservation measures of resources as long as they also applied domestically
or restrictions needed to ensure essential supply of a product. Import or export restrictions due to
                                                 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid, 141; Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 33.  
97 Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 35; “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 149.  
98 ECOC, Venturing Forth, 13.  
99 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 86. 
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national security concerns were also sanctioned by Article 907. The US could therefore institute
an import or export measure to ensure the supply of a military establishment, fulfill a defence 
contract, or to adequately deal with an armed conflict, and implement domestic policies or 









Apart from these cases, Canada would generally enjoy tariff-free access to the US mark
on the principle of national treatment, which secured an important export market. The uranium
exemptions represented further enhanced access to the US market.   
 The auto sector was already liberalized by the 1965 Canada-US Auto Pact. Due to 
increasing competition and reduced productivity, however, the US threatened to launch a CVD 
against Canadian duty remission and incentive programs from which Canadian manufacturers 
largely benefited. The 
covered by the Auto Pact secured the preservation of those programs with the exception of 
European and Asian manufacturers with Canadian plants. Both countries also retained the rig
to contest existing duty remission programs if they had an injurious impact on a domestic 
firm.101 Again, with that exception, access to the US market was achieved.102 The threat of t
abolishment of the Auto Pact manifested in the US Ottinger Bill was reduced by the agreem
                                                 
100 Ibid, 148.   
 This footnote highlights other specific provisions outside of the regular elimination of tariffs. With respect to the 
e 
Chapter 17. However, a particular advantage to Canada in terms of US market access to financial industries derived 
from Article 1702.3. This article ensured equal treatment of Canadian-controlled financial institutions in the US 
regarding any future amendments made to the Glass-Stegall Act. The principle of national treatment was also 
n 
ption from any future restrictions 
 impose.  
101 Ibid, 155-156; Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 25-27.  
102
CUSFTA on alcoholic beverages, a majority of the provisions dealt with changes required by Canadian producers. 
Canada enjoyed very liberal access to the US alcohol industry. See the DEA’s synopsis: “The Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement,” 135-136. In terms of the financial services industry, few barriers existed against Canadian 
financial companies. The provisions of the financial services chapter largely dictate changes on Canada’s part. Se
emphasized for Canadian-controlled banks in the US in their rights to establish or operate. In terms of the chapter o
investment, most of the provisions applied to changes on the Canadian side. However, the principles of national 
treatment applied to Canada as well, and the chapter also secured Canada’s exem
on foreign investment that the US government would
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 The CUSFTA was the first trade agreement to address trade in services. In Chapter
both countries agreed to apply the principle of national treatment with respect to many, but n
all, services in each 
 14, 
ot 
other’s country pursuant to Article 1402. This did not mean harmonization, 







                                                
e whether or how to 
country (as long as regulatory standards were the same for any company, regardless of 
ownership). Moreover, no laws were required to change in either country. Canada and the U
agreed not to make any new regulations more discriminatory and ensured that any new 
regulations conformed to the national treatment principle.103 This represented a significant 
diversion in the liberalized trade agreement. It conceptually created the opportunity for Ca
to secure its access to services within the US market with no difference in treatment to 
than domestic firms.  
 Closely linked to liberalized services was Chapter 15’s emphasis on the free temporary
entry for business people. Some entrepreneurs “were experiencing delays and even outright 
denial of entry for what most considered normal business travel.”104 According to Canada’s 
Department of External Affairs, some firms set up US subsidiaries or electronic companies 
simply to avoid the hassle. Chapter 15 instituted reciprocal Canada-US access in terms of 
business travel to allow for the more efficient conduct of business unhindered by business-
immigration regulations. As long as Canadians met normal health and safety regulations and 
stated the nature of their business across the border, restrictions were liberalized pursuant to 
Article 1502. This facilitated access to the US market for Canadian business travelers, subject to
Chapter 18 dispute settlement provisions if any traveler felt they were denied access to which
 
-200. The principle of National Treatment is outlined in Article 
 less favourable to any contracting party regardless of country of origin, in 
103 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 197
III of the GATT: Treatment must be no
terms of taxes, laws, or regulations. See Steger, “A Concise Guide,” 120.   
104 “The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” 215. 
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they had the right (Article 1504). These provisions applied to a variety of services, which 
included, but was not limited to, accountants, engineers, lawyers, social workers, and sales 
representatives.105  
*            *            * 
 Canada’s vision of an all-encompassing FTA with the United States was pursued to 
improve Canada’s long-term economic viability and competitiveness. Its goal of achieving 
liberalized trade was accomplished by the full reduction of conventional tariffs. Secured access 
to the US market was reinforced by principles of national treatment and a basic commitment by 
both countries to ensure new trade legislation or practices were fully compatible with the 
CUSFTA’s principles of promoting liberalized trade and rejecting protectionism. The 
“legislative watchdog” established by Article 1903 to make sure that existing US CVD and AD 
laws were not made more protectionist helped ensure this.106 However, Canada’s objective of 
attaining legally enshrined access to the US market and therefore immunity to US protectionism 
was not realized. Shared definitions of acceptable subsidization programs were not written into 
the original agreement and gains Canada would make from tariff-free access continued to be 
vulnerable to US anti-dump and countervail laws. CVDs and ADs remained the most damaging 
form of protectionism, often imposing higher duties than standard duties or tariffs. The 7-year 
timeframe for the US and Canada to create mutually agreeable countervail and anti-dump laws 
was a significant achievement in the context of the negotiations.107 The NAFTA superseded this 
process and to this day no such “safe harbour” subsidy definitions exist. The dispute settlement 
mechanisms pursuant to Chapters 18 and 19 represented the crucial shift from US unilateral 
                                                 
105 Ibid, 220-228. Also see Chapter 15 Annexes.  
106 Steger, “Dispute Settlement,” 183.  
107 As noted earlier, definitions on subsidies relevant to CVD and AD law were superseded by NAFTA regulations, 
which eventually did not provide definitions of acceptable or unacceptable subsidies.    
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interpretations and applications of its trad ral interpretations and applications of 
s were 
e laws to bilate
trade laws with a Canadian voice in disputes. Though the dispute settlement mechanism
open to criticism, they were a step in the right direction by reducing Canadian vulnerability to 
the unilateral application of procedural, legal or discreet forms of US protectionism.108   
 
                                                 
108 For fairly comprehensive outlines of Canada’s experiences with US Trade Remedy law from 1985-2007, see the 
2000,”; The Department of Foreign Affairs (Canada) and Mike Robertson, U.S. Trade Remedy Law, The Canadian 
following documents: Department of Foreign Affairs and Mike Robertson, “U.S. Trade Remedy Law…1985-
Experience, 2000-2007 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Trade Remedies Division, 

















 The Canadian pursuit of secured and enhanced access to the US market was a 
fundamental catalyst of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Canada sought a pac
to reduce its vulnerability to US protectionism. The Mulroney government, in concordanc
many in Canadian business, regarded increasingly protectionist US trade developments as both a 
threat and a reality. From the early 1980s to the signing of the historic agreeme
products were increasingly subjected to trade remedies and investigations. The incessant 
Congressional attacks on the perceived “unfair” trading practices of its partners intensified du
the 1981-1982 recession, high unemployment and the ballooning trade deficits that followed – 
despite the eventual US macroeconomic recovery. Hundreds of new trade bills were introduce
in Congress that sought restrictions on products from Canada, the Pacific Rim, the EEC and 
elsewhere. Restrictive bills did not discriminate, further demonstrating the strength of US 
protectionism. Although many bills containing restrictive provisions passed through th
and Senate, most were eventually rejected by Reagan, failing to become law. Nonethe
Canadian commercial interests became anxious of the general trading environment with its 
crucial market. FTA supporters deemed the volatile trading conditions a cause of disinvestment 
and argued that it reduced Canada’s global economic competitiveness. Success in the 
competitive
 Many Canadians perceived 1980s US trade developments as a limited threat to Canada – 
a crucial point unacknowledged in the historiography. 80 percent of Canadian exports already
entered the US market tariff-free, including Canada’s largest sectors of exports. Critics sugg
that an agreement would only increase Canada’s exposure to American protectionist tendencies, 
not reduce it, as a result of greater American scrutiny of Canadian subsidization practices. Othe
argued that Canadian industries which benefited from government subsidies would be severely
damaged by an FTA. The burdens would not outweigh the net benefits of a pact. Some 
opponents acknowledged the apparent protectionist threat and deemed it an obvious reason to 
reject an agreement. Canada would be ever-tied to US politi
 




. Nonetheless, the increased application of US 
ultilateral negotiations was a fundamental tenet of US trade policy. Washington sought 
potentially subjected to more trade restrictions during weak economic periods. The debate on the
strength and potential influence of US protectionism was a contentious issue.  
 American media and government sources, unexamined in existing historiography, 
confirmed the general increase of Congressional protectionism throughout the 1980s. Som
commentators believed that Reagan had abandoned his ideological and practical belief in free 
trade to quell the continuous pressure he faced from the House of Representatives to “solve” 
America’s trade problems. However, the sources reinforced an important distinction between 
realized trade restrictions, and their mere threat. The two Omnibus Trade Bills that eventual
became law included less protectionist measures than originally proposed, as Reagan 
continuously reminded Congress that he would veto any bills that he deemed overtly 
protectionist. Many of the bills Reagan did sign explicitly sought restrictions on Japan and 
European countries, leaving Canada unmentioned
trade remedy law in the 1980s ultimately threatened the security of access for Canadian 
exporters.  
 Despite strong Congressional protectionism, Washington continued to pursue liberalized 
trade through the1985 United States-Israel FTA, and the CUSFTA, the largest bilateral trade 
agreement ever signed. Continuous US pressure to improve the global trading environment 
through m
both liberalizing and protective pathways to improve its own global trade position and to limit 
 114
restrictions that reduced US competitiveness. The CUSFTA was not accepted by Congre
face value; many of its US critics pressed that Canadian exporters would have to become less 
subsidized in order to pass the 1988 CUSFTA Implementation Act. The American protectionist 
movement was not strong enough to avert the CUSFTA.    
 Canada’s negotiating goal of securing, enhancing and legally enshrining its access
US market was partially realized. Conventional tariffs were eliminated to zero over time. 
Nonetheless, any gains from tariff-free access ultimately remained vulnerable to the Chapter 1
and 19 dispute settlement mechan
ss at 
 to the 
8 









subsidization practices was not attained during the agreement, nor was it achieved with NAF
Nonetheless, Canada gained a significant presence in the dispute process not previously enjo
Future dispute rulings would no longer be subject to a single US trade institution. Instead, the 
newly formed Canada-United States Trade Commission would decide the outcome of each 
dispute. Although this system did not necessarily ensure greater fairness or objectivity, it was a
improvement from the unilateral application of trade laws. The overall spirit of the agreement 
represented an attempt by both countries to adhere and reinforce principles of national treatm
and to seek liberalizing resolutions to di
 In Don Campbell’s view, Canada’s presence in the bilateral dispute process was a m
step forward precisely because it included Canada.1 Although it did not shield Canada from 
protectionist US trade laws or irritants, Campbell asserted that “one of the greatest advantages o
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement is not contained in the text of the agreement at all.”2 T
national controversy over the agreement caused an increased awareness about doing cross-
                                                 
1 Don Campbell: Assistant Deputy Minister to the US (Department of External Affairs and International Trade), 
1985-1988 and Senior Assistant Deputy Minister and Chief Trade Negotiator for the first phase of CUSFTA 
implementation (1989) and Deputy Minister of International Trade (1989-1993). Interviewed by Author, 20 July 
2009.  
ampbell, Interviewed by Author, 20 July 2009.  2 Don C
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border business in general. On a plane to the first “quiet” NAFTA meeting in late 1990, 
Campbell met a Canadian businessman on the flight who, prior to the agreement, had never sold 
any products in the US. Since the implementation of the agreement, his business had doubled in 
e comprehensive 
ature of NAFTA and its dispute settlement mechanisms were based fundamentally on the 
principles and goals of the CUSFTA.   
 Canada has also concluded bilateral FTAs with Israel and Chile (1997), Costa Rica 
(2002), Columbia (2008), and the European Free Trade Association, Peru, and Jordan (2009). It 
has pending negotiations with many other countries. Although free access to as many possible 
markets is essential for Canadian export growth and stability, the vast majority of Canadian 
exports are sold to the US. Continued efforts to strengthen Canada-US trade relations to reduce 
barriers of all kinds should be a fundamental focus of Canadian trade policy. The presence of 
r 
size with half of his orders being exported to the US. Although “there was nothing in the 
agreement itself that had changed his business,” the business owner had woken up to the 
possibility of trading in the US market because of all the attention placed on the agreement.3 For 
Campbell, this change in perception became widespread throughout Canadian, American and 
Mexican business communities.  
 Since the conclusion of the CUSFTA, secured access to expanded markets has been 
pursued by Canada in tandem with an increasingly globalized trade environment. The 1994 
NAFTA, which legally superseded the CUSFTA, reinforced Canada’s access to the American 
and Mexican markets. The importance of the CUSFTA should not be underestimated by the fact 
that it was replaced by the NAFTA. In hindsight, it is difficult to conceptualize the successful 
conclusion of the NAFTA without the first achieved bilateral agreement. Th
n
trade agreements certainly does not eliminate disputes over trade practices. The softwood lumbe
                                                 
3 Ibid.  
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issue, for example, has not been conclus TA. Continued positive 
tes. In Canada’s pursuit to 
paign of newly elected President Barack 
ent due 
 the re  economy.5  
e 
struggle 
arket access should be remembered, as long as both countries 
                                              
ively resolved since NAF
relations are necessary to finding mutually agreeable solutions to dispu
expand its export markets, it must not ignore its most important market in the process.  
The economic tsunami of 2008-2009 and the cam 
Obama again raised questions in Ottawa regarding the security of Canada’s access to the 
American market.4 US protectionism has re-emerged with “Buy America” provisions etched into 
Washington’s $787 billion Economic Recovery Plan, as Americans face high unemploym
cessionary globalto
 Brian Mulroney sought a free trade agreement with the US “elephant” to strengthen and 
secure Canada’s export access, especially during periods of economic uncertainty. With the 
recent economic volatility causing protectionist undertones, the importance of positive and activ
trade relations with the United States cannot be underestimated. Canada’s long historical 
 assure and improve its US mto
continue to trade hundreds of billions in goods and services every year.      
 
   
 
et Arou ade 
mbrell
 Campbel , 5 June 2009. 
4 Campbell Clark and Rhéal Séguin, “Protectionism: Ottawa Pushes For New Chapter in Free Trade With U.S. To
G nd Buy American Provisions, PM Hopes to Bring Awarding of Local Contracts Under the Free-Tr
U a,” Globe and Mail, 4 June  2009.   
5 l Clark, “Spread of Buy American Provisions,” Globe and Mail
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